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COMMENT
PEOPLE v. JACKSON:* ROSARIO REDUCTIONISM
AND COLLATERAL ATTACKS
INTRODUCTION
In August 1978, a fire swept through a supermarket in
Brooklyn, New York, killing six firefighters and triggering a
criminal prosecution that periodically dominated local head-
lines for sixteen years. Although the 1979 conviction of Erick
Jackson seemingly closed the case, subsequent litigation re-
vealed a startling series of evidentiary lapses and prosecutorial
misconduct severe enough to warrant a new trial. When the
dust settled, after spending nearly ten years in prison, Erick
Jackson was a free man.'
Those who followed the case through the headlines might
view the Jackson case as one involving tragic deaths, an in-
competent trial defense and falsified and withheld evidence.
Jackson's true legal legacy, however, lies outside the more
lurid details of the case. Late in 1991, a New York Court of
Appeals ruling on a procedural aspect of a crucial criminal
doctrine changed the standard of review for certain discovery
violations and created a new, more restrictive rule for appeal-
ing prosecutorial non-compliance. With all of the public rancor
surrounding Jackson, it is this exception that most deserves
* 78 N.Y.2d 638, 585 N.E.2d 795, 578 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1991).
Soon after Jackion's recent acquittal, New York Times columnist Bob Herbert
wrote, "Now it's time to investigate the investigators." Brooklyn's Obsessive Pursuit,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1994, § 4, at 15. He had previously written, "Driven by
ambition, misguided loyalties and intense political pressures, public officials resort-
ed to astounding levels of misconduct in the aftermath of the tragic . . . fire in
Brooklyn in 1978." Bob Herbert, Disregard of the Truth, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1994,
§ 4, at 17.
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the legal community's attention.
In 1961, the New York Court of Appeals decided People v.
Rosario2 and established a state discovery rule for criminal
cases.3 The Rosario rule, as first fashioned, required the prose-
cution to disclose all prior statements made by state witnesses
to defense counsel before cross-examination.4 Unlike the feder-
al standard,5 the applicable standard of review for a Rosario
violation has evolved from a "harmless error" analysis to a per
se rule mandating reversal.6 The rule and its gradual expan-
sion have engendered heated polemics between prosecutors,
who dislike the rule, and defense attorneys, who depend on it.7
Throughout its existence, the rule also has weathered acrimo-
nious objections from members of the bench.'
2 9 N.Y.2d 286, 173 N.E.2d 881, 213 N.Y.S.2d 448, cert. denied, 386 U.S. 866
(1961).
' The purpose of the rule was to require the prosecution to provide potential
impeachment materials to the defense to guard against inconsistent or inaccurate
testimony. This judge-made rule was later codified in New York Criminal Proce-
dure Law ("CPL") § 240.20 (McKinney 1993). Unlike the common-law Rosario rule,
however, the statute does not specify a remedy in the event of non-compliance; it
simply delineates what constitutes Rosario materials and when they must be
turned over.
4 The pre-Rosario New York rule allowed the court to determine the prior
statements' relevancy as impeachment materials before ordering them to be dis-
closed to the defense. See People v. Walsh, 262 N.Y. 140, 186 N.E. 422 (1933).
The purpose of Rosario was to allow the defense, rather than the court, to deter-
mine use-value since defense counsel was in the best position to make such a
decision. Rosario, 9 N.Y.2d at 289, 173 N.E.2d at 883, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 450. By
requiring the prosecution to make all prior statements available to the defense,
the burden of acquiring prior statements was shifted from the defense to the pros-
ecution.
' See People v. Jencks, 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
6 Under the original Rosario rule, if the prosecution failed to disclose all prior
statements by government witnesses, the appellate court would apply a harmless
error analysis in deciding whether or not to vacate the verdict. Rosario, 9 N.Y.2d
286, 173 N.E.2d at 884, 213 N.Y.S.2d 448. In subsequent decisions, however, the
Court of Appeals redefined Rosario to require a per se, automatic reversal. See
infra text accompanying notes 51-83.
' See, e.g., Jay M. Cohen & Michael Gore, An Appropriate Measure of Preju-
dice, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 21, 1992, at 2; Jan Hoffman, New Loophole for Appeals: Tape
Cassette, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1993, § 1, at 29; William M. Kunstler, Goodbye to
Rosario, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 10, 1992, at 2; James C. McKinley Jr., Secret Memos by
Police Are Sought, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 1990, at B3.
8 See, e.g., Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d at 650, 585 N.E.2d at 803, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 491
(Titone, J., dissenting); People v. Jones, 70 N.Y.2d 547, 553, 517 N.E.2d 865, 869,
523 N.Y.S.2d 53, 57 (1987) (Bellacosa, J., concurring); People v. Novoa, 70 N.Y.2d
490, 500, 517 N.E.2d 219, 225, 522 N.Y.S.2d 504, 510 (1987) (Bellacosa, J., concur-
ring); Rosario, 9 N.Y.2d at 292, 173 N.E.2d at 884, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 452 (Froessel,
1230 [Vol. 60: 1229
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As the Rosario rule developed from a limited, low-impact
discovery requirement into a stringent, per se rule, the focus of
the debate shifted from whether the prosecution should, as a
matter of course, be compelled to produce certain prior state-
ments to what the consequences for non-compliance ought to
be.9 The change in the standard of review is important be-
cause a per se standard often produces results that differ from
a harmless error standard."0 Proponents of the per se stan-
J., concurring).
' In Rosario, three members of the bench concurred, but argued that:
A defendant should of course be entitled to probe fully any contra-
dictory matter, but ought not to be permitted to embark on a fishing
expedition in the expectation of discovering subtle shades of meaning and
immaterial variances in a prior statement of a witness . . . . Such a
practice would undoubtedly prolong trials and produce confusion, without
in any way promoting the ends of justice.
9 N.Y.2d at 292, 173 N.E.2d at 885, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 453 (Froessel, J., concurring).
The above quote reflects the view that the discovery requirement itself, as institut-
ed by the majority, was problematic. In a later decision, however, Rosario critics
assailed the per se standard rather than the responsibility to produce: "[the per se
rule] is a law enforcer's nightmare and a perpetrator's delight. Insofar as the rule
is not constitutionally rooted, I believe it would be useful for the Legislature to
consider ... overcoming the per se-ness [sic] of this exalted court-made rule."
Jones, 70 N.Y.2d at 557, 517 N.E.2d at 872, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 60 (Bellacosa, J.,
concurring). The above quote was cited approvingly by its author in a post-,Tackson
decision, which suggested that an alternative to the per se rule might be found in
open-file discovery. People v. Banch, 80 N.Y.2d 610, 626-27, 608 N.E.2d 1069,
1079, 593 N.Y.S.2d 491, 501 (1992) (Bellacosa, J., dissenting). Clearly, production
was no longer an issue. It was instead the per se standard that drew the
dissenters' wrath.
"0 The differences are fairly manifest, regardless of the criminal case context. A
harmless error analysis would force the defendant to prove not only the existence
of the error but also particularized prejudice. The use of the per se standard
makes proof of an error dispositive, irrespective of any signs of prejudice. A harm-
less error review increases the burden of proof for the defendant since he is the
moving party. Proving the violation becomes a necessary but inconclusive step in
the process. He then must demonstrate how the withheld statements could have
been used to gain a more favorable outcome at trial. Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d at 648-
49, 585 N.E.2d at 801-02, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 490; see also People v. Crimmins, 367
N.Y.2d 230, 326 N.E.2d 787, 367 N.Y.S.2d 213 (1975) (discussing the use of harm-
less error analysis in criminal appeals).
Depending on the trial judge, this burden may be fairly high. Even if the
material has exculpatory value, other overwhelming proof of guilt may allow the
court to find that there still was no reasonable possibility that this material would
have affected the outcome of the trial. People v. Robles, 153 Misc. 2d 859, 583
N.Y.S.2d 138 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1992) (overwhelming evidence of guilt ren-
dered harmless failure to provide material not clearly exculpatory); People v. Jack-
son, 65 N.Y.2d 265, 480 N.E.2d 727, 491 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1985) (existence of conflict-
ing testimony does not mean jury should not have convicted).
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dard argue that the rule is essential for developing a fully
informed defense." The importance of this principle, support-
ers argue, coupled with the difficulty in determining the actual
harm caused by the error, make the per se rule a necessity. 2
Opponents of the per se rule claim that, in many instances, the
violations concern materials that are of de minimis value at
best.'3 Thus, the opponents assert, the strict liability standard
is draconian and leads to unjust results. 14
A third argument, central to the adversarial process in
criminal prosecutions, was not addressed by the Court of Ap-
peals in its development of the Rosario doctrine. This position
recognizes that the Rosario rule acts to enforce prosecutorial
compliance with discovery. Whether one believes that Rosario
deters prosecutorial negligence and misconduct depends upon
one's view of prosecutorial ethics generally. This aspect of
The per se rule is much more generous to the defendant. Providing it can be
established that the error in question occurred, the defendant is entitled to the
appropriate remedy-automatic reversal of conviction. Hence, the choice of oper-
ating standard of review is an important, if not key, component of Rosario.
" The reasoning behind this is simply that the prior statements might be used
by the defense to impeach the government's witnesses. This would, of course, un-
dermine the witnesses' credibility and bolster a defendant's case. Thus, pretrial ac-
cess to the statements could directly influence trial strategy.
12 Prior to Jackson, the Court of Appeals had held that a harmless error anal-
ysis was inapplicable to Rosario violations because such an analysis necessarily
would be purely speculative. Jones, 70 N.Y.2d at 552 n.4, 517 N.E.2d at 868 n.4,
523 N.Y.S.2d at 56 n.4. The analysis was considered inherently impossible since it
would have to be founded on what the defense counsel might have done with the
material, how the witness or witnesses might have responded, and how this infor-
mation and witness reaction would be viewed by the jury. The Jones court seemed
to say that it was not possible for an appellate court to make such distinctions
about witnesses, counsel or juries.
13 This is a central point of disagreement. Opponents of the per se standard
believe that there are clear cases of incidental violations that would not, or could
not, have had any impact on a jury's verdict. Proponents are likely to counter that
this view of any particular case is subjective and cannot be supported empirically.
This latter view is essentially the same one presented by the Jones court, but is
not universally shared by all members of the court. In what can only be called a
"bitter concurrence," Judge Bellacosa argued that in more cases than not the ac-
tions of the prosecutors could in no way be "deemed to have contextually, poten-
tially and prejudicially affected the outcome and the fairness of the procedures
affecting [defendants'] rights," as such, he found the per se rule to be counter-
productive. Id. at 557, 517 N.E.2d at 871, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 59 (Bellacosa, J., con-
curring).
14 See id. at 553-57, 517 N.E.2d at 869-72, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 57-60 (Bellacosa,
J., concurring); Banch, 80 N.Y.2d at 621-27, 608 N.E.2d at 1076-79, 593 N.Y.S.2d
at 498-501 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting); see also Cohen & Gore, supra note 7, at 2.
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criminal litigation-good and bad faith on the part of the in-
terested parties-is highly inflammatory and subject to vastly
apposite views. Despite the resentment caused by implications
of unethical conduct, this issue must be addressed because dis-
covery compliance is vital to the criminal justice system.
In 1991, People v. Jackson5 offered the New York Court
of Appeals an opportunity to restate its position on Rosario.
The conviction of the defendant, Erick Jackson, 6 on six
counts of murder and one count of arson had been affirmed on
appeal. 7 After his appeal was exhausted, Jackson discovered
that the prosecution had withheld assorted statements made
by government witnesses as well as other exculpatory materi-
al. 8 Consequently, Jackson filed a collateral motion to vacate
with the trial court, pursuant to the Criminal Procedure Law
("CPL") section 440.10.'9 The trial court found that there had
been a Rosario violation and, pursuant to the per se rule, va-
cated the judgment." The appellate court confirmed the vaca-
tur and the state appealed to the Court of Appeals.2'
In its appeal the government claimed that Jackson's mo-
tion should not have been decided under the per se standard
because the statute governing motions to vacate required Jack-
son to prove prejudice.22 Hence, the issue presented to the
15 78 N.Y.2d 638, 585 N.E.2d 795, 578 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1991). The court also
heard a companion case to Jackson that was decided under the same line of rea-
soning. See People v. Wahad, 79 N.Y.2d 787, 587 N.E.2d 274, 579 N.Y.S.2d 636
(1991).
16 Erick Jackson, also used the names Eric Knight and Jackson-Knight. In the
interests of clarity, this Comment will refer to the defendant as Erick Jackson.
17 People v. Jackson, 103 A.D.2d 1047, 479 N.Y.S.2d 390 (2d Dep't 1984).
'8 People v. Jackson, 142 Misc. 2d 853, 853, 538 N.Y.S.2d 677, 677 (Sup. Ct.
Kings County 1988).
" Id. New York CPL § 440.10(1) lists eight separate grounds for granting a
motion to vacate judgment: (a) improper jurisdiction; (b) judgment was procured by
duress, misrepresentation, or fraud; (c) material evidence adduced at trial resulting
in judgment was false and known to be false by the prosection or court; (d) mate-
rial evidence was procured in violation of defendant's constitutional rights; (e)
defendant lacked capacity to understand criminal proceedings; (f) improper and
prejudicial conduct not appearing in the record; (g) new evidence has been discov-
ered; (h) judgment was in violation of defendant's constitutional rights. N.Y. CRIM.
PROC. L. § 440.10 (McKinney 1994).
20 Jackson, 142 Misc. 2d 853, 856, 538 N.Y.S.2d 677, 679.
21 Jackson, 162 A.D.2d 470, 556 N.Y.S.2d 165 (2d Dep't 1990).
People v. Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d 638, 585 N.E.2d 795, 578 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1991).
The relevant part of CPL § 440.10 is subsection (1)(f), which provides for a rever-
sal when "improper and prejudicial conduct not appearing in the record occurred
1994]
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Court of Appeals was whether the per se reversal rule applied
to Rosario violations when raised through a collateral motion,
rather than direct appeal. The Court did not address the
particular misconduct; instead it focused on the appropriate
standard of review.
Viewing Jackson as "novel," the court attempted to "har-
monize" the per se reversal rule of Rosario and the statutory
requirement of a case-specific finding of harm to the defen-
dant 4 The majority understood Jackson to present an issue
reflecting competing policy considerations and thus attempted
to integrate these concerns.2 ' The court held that when a
Rosario violation is presented in a CPL 440.10 motion, the per
se rule does not apply, and the defendant must "make an actu-
al showing that prejudice resulted from the prosecution's fail-
ure to turn over Rosario material."26 The court reaffirmed its
commitment to Rosario, however, ruling that the per se stan-
dard would still apply when a defendant's direct appeal was
still pending.27 Thus, if the violation was raised prior to the
during a trial resulting in the judgment which conduct, if it had appeared in the
record, would have required a reversal of the judgment upon an appeal therefrom."
N.Y. Clum. PRoc. L. § 440.10(1)(f).
Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d 638, 641, 585 N.E.2d 795, 797, 578 N.Y.S.2d 483, 485.
This is an important distinction because it could affect a great number of cases.
When a defendant learns after the judgment is entered that prior statements
made by government witnesses had been withheld, the defendant's only means of
relief is through a CPL § 440.10 motion. Because the Rosario violation was not
part of the record, the defendant would be precluded from raising the matter on
direct appeal.
24 Id. at 641, 585 N.E.2d at 797, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 485; see N.Y. CRIM. PROC. L.
§ 440.10.
' The court explicitly sought to weigh the defendant's right to full discovery of
state witnesses' prior statements against the societal interest in finality and the
lack of time constraints in CPL § 440.10. Id. at 643, 585 N.E.2d at 798, 578
N.Y.S.2d at 486.
26 Id. at 641, 585 N.E.2d at 797, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 485.
27 Id. at 648, 585 N.E.2d at 801, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 489 ("This holding does not
represent a de facto elimination of the per se error rule, as the dissent contends.")
The majority's pronounced reaffirmation had been disputed by the dissent which
claimed that the holding in Jackson eviscerated Rosario. Id. at 650-51, 585 N.E.2d
at 803, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 491 (Titone, J. dissenting) (" [T]he practical effect of the
Court's decision here will be to make relief for Rosario violations virtually unavail-
able in post-conviction proceedings"). Although in a post-Jackson case the court
discussed the holding in Jackson as though it were simply an exception to the
norm, see People v. Banch, 80 N.Y.S. 610, 616, 608 N.E.2d 1069, 1072, 593
N.Y.S.2d 491, 494 (1992) (listing Jackson as one of three narrow exceptions to
Rosario), the dissent in Jackson clearly believed that the majority's opinion would
1234 [Vol. 60: 1229
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appellate court's ruling, it would require an automatic rever-
sal.2" Once direct appeal was exhausted, however, a defendant
would have to demonstrate that the violation had a "reason-
able possibility of contribut[ing] to the verdict."29
This Comment contends that the over-arching purpose of
the Jackson decision was to place a de facto time limit on
Rosario. By so doing, the majority has effectively rejected the
rationale of Rosario's per se reversal standard and, thus, has
eliminated, albeit unpersuasively, the need for retaining
Rosario in its current form. In creating this new exception, the
majority opinion has fashioned a rule that is internally incon-
sistent and simply irrational. Furthermore, the holding both
fails to advance the very societal interests the court claims
justified the new rule and weakens the incentive for prosecuto-
rial compliance with Rosario's obligations."0 Finally, by intro-
ducing judicial subjectivity in the application of previously
settled case law, Jackson has created confusion among the
lower courts resulting in disparate decisions and an uncertain
legal standard.
Part I of this Comment explores the historical develop-
ment of the Rosario doctrine through Jacksoni and the institu-
tion of the per se standard. Next, Part II discusses the factual
and procedural history of Jackson, and examines the nature
and scope of the Rosario materials withheld from the defense.
substantially weaken Rosario's application.
Because the court recognized that the ruling in Jackson would create a dis-
parity between defendants who had their Rosario claims in the record for direct
appeal and those who did not, the court also held that the shift from per se to
harmless error would not take effect until the defendant's direct appeal had been
exhausted. Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d at 649, 585 N.E.2d at 802, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 490.
28 Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d at 641, 585 N.E.2d at 797, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 485.
29 Id. at 649, 585 N.E.2d at 802, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 490.
"' Whether the majority had another agenda or was truly motivated by the
arguments posited in the opinion is a matter of speculation. As the analysis con-
cludes, however, the apparent goal was to limit the reach of Rosario, effectively
limiting defendants' collateral remedies and allowing the prosecution more leeway
in complying with CPL § 240.20. See supra note 3. The long-term goal of some
members of the court seems to be the complete abolition of the per se standard
for Rosario violations. See, e.g., Bunch, 80 N.Y.2d at 622, 608 N.E.2d at 1076, 593
N.Y.S.2d at 498 (1992) (Bellacosa, J., dissenting); Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d at 660 n.6,
585 N.E.2d at 809 n.6, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 497 n.6 (Titone, J., dissenting) (expressing
skepticism of majority's stated commitment to Rosario). But see id. at 650, 585
N.E.2d at 802, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 491 (majority opinion affirming court's commitment
to Rosario doctrine).
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Finally, Part III analyzes the significance of the Jackson
court's decision in terms of its statutory construction, use of
precedent, and the relationship between the doctrine of finality
and Jackson. The Comment concludes by considering the effect
of Jackson on prosecutorial compliance and the consequences
of the holding on post-Jackson cases.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE RosARIo DOCTRINE
In People v. Rosario,"' the Court of Appeals instituted a
new rule regarding the disclosure of statements by government
witnesses to the defense. Prior to Rosario, New York procedure
had required the trial court to determine which prior state-
ments were relevant to the defendant and allowed only those
materials to be seen by defense counsel. 2 In cases where the
trial court improperly denied a discovery request, appellate
courts applied a harmless error test.33 The ruling in Rosario
eliminated the old rule by requiring that all prior statements
be turned over to the defense regardless of their impeachment
value. Rosario did retain the harmless error analysis standard
of review for the appellate level, but its mandate of automatic
full disclosure of all prior statements by government witnesses
represented a radical departure from the court's prior posi-
tion.34
In Rosario, after three witnesses for the state had testi-
fied, defense counsel requested that their prior statements be
turned over for use on cross examination.35 The statements
were given to the trial judge who found some "variances" be-
tween the prior statements and the trial testimony but deemed
M1 9 N.Y.2d 286, 173 N.E.2d 881, 213 N.Y.S.2d 448 (1961).
32 People v. Walsh, 262 N.Y. 140, 186 N.E. 422, 265 N.Y.S. 140 (1933).
- Id. at 144, 186 N.E. at 423, 265 N.Y.S. at 144.
3' At the time Rosario was decided, the issue before the court concerned who
should make the initial decision on relevancy. The essence of Rosario was that a
decision on the relevancy of prior statements should lie with defense counsel. See
infra text accompanying note 43. Thus, the trial cours role shifted from one of
determining relevancy to one of verifying prosecutorial compliance. In this context,
it is easy to see why initial debate over Rosario turned on the issue of compelling
the prosecution to produce the statements, not the consequential evaluation of a
failure to comply with this requirement. Rosario, 9 N.Y.2d 286, 289-91, 173 N.E.2d
881, 883-84, 213 N.Y.S.2d 448, 450-51 (explicitly overruling Walsh and prohibiting
trial judges from determining which documents defense counsel may view).
"' Id. at 288, 173 N.E.2d at 882, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 449.
[Vol. 60: 12291236
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only certain portions relevant to the defense.36 Rosario was
convicted on all charges and sentenced accordingly. On appeal,
Rosario argued that the trial court had erred in denying de-
fense counsel access to specific prior statements.
The Court of Appeals observed that, while New York's
existing rule allowed the defense to see and use only purely
inconsistent statements, the recently announced federal Jencks
rule had no such restrictions.8 Apparently persuaded by the
Supreme Court, the Rosario court held that:
a right sense of justice entitles the defense to examine a witness'
prior statement, whether or not it varies from his testimony on the
stand. As long as the statement relates to the subject matter of the
witness' testimony and contains nothing that must be kept confiden-
tial, defense counsel should be allowed to determine for themselves
the use to be made of it on cross examination.
39
In addition to a "right sense of justice," two other related
findings influenced the court's decision to adopt the Jencks
standard. First, the court found that despite the state's prevail-
ing view on the subject at that time, pretrial statements of-
fered more than just a source of contradictions with which to
confront and discredit a witness.40 For instance, pretrial state-
ments "seemingly in harmony" with trial testimony might still
reveal bias, additional knowledge, shades of meaning, stress,
or additions or omissions, all of which could help the defense
place the direct testimony of the witnesses in an entirely dif-
36 Id. at 288, 173 N.E.2d at 882, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 450.
37Id.
'8 Id. at 288-89, 173 N.E.2d at 882-84, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 450-51. The U.S. Su-
preme Court had held that a defendant was entitled to inspect any statement
made by government witnesses bearing on the subject matter of their testimony.
Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
'9 Rosario, 9 N.Y.2d at 289, 173 N.E.2d at 883, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 449. The court
appeared to accept the Supreme Court's analysis of prior statements' use value:
Every experienced trial judge and trial lawyer knows the value for
impeaching purposes of statements of the witness recording the events
before time dulls treacherous memory. Flat contradiction between the
witness' testimony and the version of the events given in his reports is
not the only test of inconsistency. The omission from the reports of facts
related at the trial, or a contrast in emphasis upon the same facts, even
a different order of treatment, are also relevant to the cross-examining
process of testing the credibility of a witness' trial testimony.
Jencks, 353 U.S. at 667.
" Rosario, 9 N.Y.2d at 289, 173 N.E.2d at 883, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 449.
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ferent perspective.41 Since impeachment could be accom-
plished through a subtle use of prior statements, the court
necessarily concluded that impeachable materials consisted of
more than just blatantly conflicting statements.
The question of who was to decide the use-value of Rosario
material also influenced the court's decision. Since prior state-
ments could be employed in a myriad of ways, the court rea-
soned, the "single-minded defense counsel for the accused ...
is in a far better position to appraise the value of a witness'
pretrial statements" than is the trial judge.42 Moreover, the
prior procedure-where defense lawyers argued about the
relevance of statements before viewing their contents-was
illogical and fairly useless.43 The court concluded that as long
as the government's information is not required to be kept
confidential, providing the material to the defense would pro-
mote a more just end.' If the information is of little or no
value, then disclosing it would cause no harm. Conversely,
withholding the information could deprive defense counsel of a
legitimate opportunity to impeach a prosecution witness.45
Despite its finding that trial judges were not the most
suitable parties to evaluate pre-trial statements, the court
41 Id. at 290, 173 N.E.2d at 883, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 450.
42 Id. at 290, 173 N.E.2d at 883, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 451.
' Observing this procedure, the court wondered how the defense could argue
that prior statements contain something of value when they were not allowed to
see them first. Id.
" The court explicitly limited the range of material to the subject matter of
the witness' testimony. Because the use of the prior statements also was limited
to cross examination, there was little chance that the materials would serve any
purpose other than impeachment. Id. CPL § 240.20 has since expanded and speci-
fied the materials that fall under the Rosario umbrella. Some of the materials
covered by CPL § 240.20(1) are:
(a) Any written, recorded or oral statement of the defendant, and of a co-
defendant to be tried jointly, made, other than in the course of the crimi-
nal transaction, to a public servant engaged in law enforcement activity
[or his agent];
(c) Any written report or document, or portion thereof, concerning a phys-
ical or mental examination, or scientific test or experiment, relating to
the criminal action or proceeding which was made by, or at the request
or direction of a public servant engaged in law enforcement activity, or
which was made by a person whom the prosecutor intends to call as a
witness at trial, or which the people intend to introduce at trial ....
N.Y. CRIm. PROC. L. § 240.20(a), (c).
" Rosario, 9 N.Y.2d at 290, 173 N.E.2d at 884, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 451.
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retained the harmless error analysis.46 Thus, even though the
court found that trial judges could not properly determine the
impeachment value of prior statements, it decided that appel-
late courts could. This apparent contradiction was commented
upon by the concurring opinion, which argued that retaining
the harmless error analysis invalidated the purpose and princi-
ple of the holding.47
Accordingly, the court could maintain logical consistency
only through the continued application of the older rule. Seem-
ingly recognizing the paradox, the Court of Appeals moved to
create a more universal standard but opted, however, to re-
move judicial discretion from the appellate courts rather than
reinstate it at the trial level.
In 1976, the court decided People v. Consolazio," the first
in a chain of cases that expanded and clarified Rosario. In
Consolazio, the defendant appealed the trial court's decision
not to compel the prosecution to turn over unsigned witness
questionnaires, arguing the failure constituted a Rosario viola-
tion.49 While creating a narrow exception to the rule,
46 Id. at 291, 173 N.E.2d at 884, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 451.
47 Id. at 293, 173 N.E.2d at 885, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 453 (Froessel, J., concurring).
The majority held that "appellate Judges may now examine the prior statements,
and conclude that the variances they disclose are of such a trivial and inconse-
quential character that they may be disregarded. If we may, why may not the
Trial Judge be given the same right in the first instance?" Id. Because the ma-
jority ultimately affirmed Rosario's conviction, Judges Froessel, Dye and Burke
concurred in the result. They most certainly dissented, however, from the
majority's acceptance of the federal standard articulated in Jencks.
48 40 N.Y.2d 446, 354 N.E.2d 801, 387 N.Y.S.2d 62 (1976).
" Id. The defense also argued that failure to compel the prosecution to turn
over its evidence was a Brady violation. A Brady violation occurs when the prose-
cution fails to disclose exculpatory material in its possession. Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83 (1963). Brady and Rosario are similar in that both cover materials
that are withheld by the prosecution. There are, however, two major distinctions.
One is that Brady material does not have to relate to government witnesses. That
is, the focus in a Brady investigation concerns exculpation, not impeachment. In
contrast, Rosario material is directly associated with state witnesses and their
testimony. The criteria is not whether the material is exculpatory, but whether it
is merely a prior statement. The other distinction is that New York applies a
harmless error analysis for Brady violations. For a discussion of New York's view
on Brady violations, see People v. Vilardi, 76 N.Y.2d 67, 555 N.E.2d 915, 556
N.Y.S.2d 518 (1990). The reason for the second distinction flows from the first.
The court finds that it is easier to determine the exculpatory value of something
by contrasting it with the known facts at trial. Thus, its impact in terms of harm
can be assessed contextually. See Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d 638, 653-54, 585 N.E.2d 795,
804-05, 578 N.Y.S.2d 483, 492-93 (Titone, J. dissenting). Rosario material is trick-
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Consolazio greatly extended Rosario by assuming a per se
standard for appellate review."
The Consolazio court rejected the state's argument that
the questionnaires were work product, finding instead that
they were statements in narrative form. Therefore, the state-
ments normally would be Rosario material.51 In Consolazio,
however, the court found the specific questionnaires to be ex-
empted from Rosario because they were "duplicative equiva-
lents" of the witnesses' grand jury testimony.12 The court ap-
parently found that since Rosario violations normally deprive
defendants of materials that might alter the outcome of the
trial, it followed that if for all practical purposes the materials
already were in the defendant's possession, then the defense
suffered no harm. 3
ier to evaluate because it is not possible to tell if the defense attorney would have
successfully impeached a government witness with the prior statement. It also is
not feasible to gauge if depriving the defendant of the opportunity for im-
peachment would probably, or possibly, have led to a different verdict. See, e.g.,
People v. Jones, 70 N.Y.2d 547, 552 n.4, 517 N.E.2d 865, 868 n.4, 523 N.Y.S.2d
53, 56 n.4 ("the conclusion that the information was of no value must necessarily
be founded on sheer speculation").
5" Although the Consolazio court did not explicitly endorse the per se standard,
it certainly established it constructively. The court specifically rejected the argu-
ment that a Rosario violation could be considered harmless because of its signifi-
cance to the defense, and it eliminated harmless error as an appropriate standard
of review. Consolazio, 40 N.Y.2d at 454, 354 N.E.2d at 805, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 66.
Thus, the per se standard was instituted by default. See also People v. Banch, 80
N.Y.2d at 623, 608 N.E.2d 1069, 1077, 593 N.Y.S.2d 491, 499 (1992) (Bellacosa, J.,
dissenting) ("the new per se era dawned with People v. Consolazio").
" Consolazio, 40 N.Y.2d at 453, 354 N.E.2d at 805, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 65. To
further illustrate the difference between Rosario and Brady, one can see that if
the unsigned statements were considered prior statements by government witness-
es they would then be Rosario material. The per se standard would require a re-
versal without any further exploration. But if the court was looking for a Brady
violation, then the test would be different. The court would not be interested in
whether or not the statements fell under the Rosario umbrella and were related to
government witnesses who would testify at trial. The only question would be
whether or not the materials exculpated the defendant, and if so, did withholding
them cause the defendant a significant degree of harm.
52 Id. at 454, 354 N.E.2d at 805, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 66.
' Id. at 454, 354 N.E.2d at 806, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 66. The court observed that
the prosecution would be much better served by simply turning over any material
it thinks might be Rosario material, instead of assuming that something was sim-
ply cumulative. Id. at 454-55, 354 N.E.2d at 806, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 66-67. There is
no advantage in withholding the material as duplicative statements would already
be constructively possessed by the defense. But, if the trial or appellate court
decided that the materials were not actually duplicative, the conviction would be
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Although the court did not reverse in Consolazio, it did
hold "that a failure to turn over Rosario material may not be
excused on the ground that such material would have been of
limited or of no use to the defense."54 Furthermore, the court
stated, "[w]e thus reject arguments that consideration of the
significance of the content or substance of a witness' prior
statement can result in a finding of harmless error."55 The
language in Consolazio tacitly endorsed a per se standard of
review by distinctly rejecting the possibility that a Rosario
violation could be found to be harmless error.
Nine years later, the Court of Appeals decided another
case that further entrenched per se reversals as the necessary
response to a Rosario violation. In People v. Perez,56 the court
considered whether the withholding of statements made by a
government witness to the defendant's family that had been
taped by the prosecution was Rosario material. The state con-
tended that since the statements were made to private parties,
they were not Rosario material." The court rejected that ar-
gument, finding the defense's request reasonable since the
statements were in the prosecution's possession. 8 The court
found that CPL section 240.20(1)(a)-the statute specifying
which materials fall under Rosario-made no such distinction
between public or private conversations.59 The court also stat-
ed that CPL section 240.20(1)(a) required the material to be
turned over early in the proceedings, prior to opening state-
ments in jury trials, rather than before cross-examination as
originally dictated by Rosario." The court noted that although
a delay in turning over Rosario materials may not harm every
defendant, it could cause substantial harm to the defense in
any particular case.6' Because the degree of harm could not
put in jeopardy.
"' Id. at 454, 354 N.E.2d at 805, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 66.
55 Id.
sr 65 N.Y.2d 154, 480 N.E.2d 361, 490 N.Y.S.2d 747 (1985).
57 Id. at 158, 480 N.E.2d at 363, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 749.
58 Id. at 158-59, 480 N.E.2d at 363-64, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 749-50.
ro Id. at 158, 480 N.E.2d at 363-64, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 750; see also supra note
44.
co Id. at 158, 480 N.E.2d at 363, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 749. This is because the
prior statements not only might influence the cross examination process, they
could have an impact on opening arguments and trial strategy as a whole. Id.
61 Perez, 65 N.Y.2d at 159, 480 N.E.2d at 364, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 750. It is not
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be determined in a post-hoc analysis, the potential for substan-
tial harm compelled an automatic reversal.62
In People v. Ranghelle,63 the court specified further that
the cause of the Rosario violation was irrelevant; good faith
efforts to comply with the rule would not excuse the
prosecution's failure to comply.' In so doing, the court distin-
guished between a delay in compliance and total failure to
comply. When the failure is a "mere delay" and not a total
failure to comply, the defendant must show that he or she was
prejudiced by the delay.65 This exception for mere delay was
grounded in the availability of immediate remedies such as
revising jury instructions or recalling a witness to the stand for
further questioning by the defense.6 6 Again, the court af-
firmed the per se rule with attendant quotations from
Consolazio and Rosario.
The Rosario line of cases concluded with People v.
Novoa and People v. Jones.69 These companion decisions
emphasized that the Rosario doctrine precluded the use of
harmless error analysis and seemingly provided for CPL sec-
tion 440.10 motions to operate on a per se basis.
In Novoa, the defendant was tried for second degree mur-
der. After the conviction had been entered, a CPL section
clear if the court was referring to the harm that could result from a court's appli-
cation of the harmless error test, or if it was indirectly addressing the issue of
prosecutorial compliance.
62 Id. at 159, 480 N.E.2d at 364, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 750.
69 N.Y.2d 56, 503 N.E.2d 1011, 511 N.Y.S.2d 580 (1986).
Id. at 63, 503 N.E.2d at 1016, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 585. In Ranghelle, one of the
issues concerned the memo pads of two police officers who testified at trial. The
memo pads were not turned over to the defense and the officers read from them
on the stand. On appeal, the court rejected the argument that the reading of the
memo pads constituted production of the materials. Id. at 65, 503 N.E.2d at 1017,
511 N.Y.S.2d at 586.
6 "Delay" refers to a violation that is corrected before the close of evidence.
"Total failure" occurs when the withheld material is not disclosed until after the
trial. Id. at 63, 503 N.E.2d at 1016, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 585.
66 Because the defendant can recall the witness to the stand, the witness can
still be confronted with the prior statements. There also is the possibility of ob-
taining jury instructions to mitigate any possible prejudice resulting from what
may appear to be confusion on the part of the defense. Of course, the latter is
within the court's discretion. But, as long as the defense has not rested it is not
necessarily too late to employ the previously withheld materials.
67 Ranghelle, 69 N.Y.2d at 63, 503 N.E.2d at 1016, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 585.
66 70 N.Y.2d 490, 517 N.E.2d 219, 522 N.Y.S.2d 504 (1987).
69 70 N.Y.2d 547, 517 N.E.2d 865, 523 N.Y.S.2d 53 (1987).
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440.10 motion was filed, in part, based on Rosario violations.
During the investigation, one prosecution witness made state-
ments to a police detective, who recorded the statements and
gave them to the trial assistant for the prosecution. The state
acknowledged that it had not turned over the statements to
the defense but argued that the error was inadvertent and that
the statements were insubstantial.7 ° The trial judge held that
since the error was unintentional, the strict liability rule did
not apply.7 The court also found that the defendant had suf-
fered no prejudice and denied the motion to vacate. The Court
of Appeals reversed, holding that inadvertence did not excuse
the error.72 Specifically, the court noted that "in the eleven
years since Consolazio, this court has not deviated from the
principle that harmless error analysis is inappropriate with
respect to Rosario violations." 3
By contrast, in Jones, the defendant's conviction for selling
and possessing narcotics was affirmed by the Court of Ap-
peals, 4 which then granted defendant's motion for reargu-
ment and vacated its prior order. Using the per se rule, the
court remanded the case for a new trial on Rosario grounds.7
The Court of Appeals found that "[tihe sole issue is whether
the prosecution's total failure to deliver Rosario material to de-
fense counsel as required by the rule is subject to harmless
error analysis."7 ' The Jones court omitted all discussion of the
procedural mechanisms involved in bringing the appeal. The
only material issue, therefore, was whether the violation had
occurred.
As in Novoa, the court again relied on Consolazio and, in
discussing the harmless error standard, unequivocally stated:
[T]he significant fact is that the conclusion that the information was
of no value must necessarily be founded on sheer speculation as to
what might have occurred and matters not in the record: i.e., the
questions counsel might have asked or avoided asking, how the
witness might have answered, and how such differences in the testi-
70 Novoa, 70 N.Y.2d at 495, 517 N.E.2d at 222, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 507.
71 Id.
72 Id.
71 Id. at 499, 517 N.E.2d -at 224, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 509.
7' 70 N.Y.2d 547, 517 N.E.2d 865, 523 N.Y.S.2d 53 (1987).
71 Id. at 548, 517 N.E.2d at 866, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 54.
76 Id.
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mony might have affected the decision of the jury.7 7
The court found that this rejection of the harmless error ap-
proach was not a departure from the existing rule.7" It argued
that the decision in Ranghelle, which held that good faith was
immaterial, was a logical application of the rule originally
framed in Rosario and "carried forward" in Consolazio and
other cases.79
This chain of cases formed the Rosario rule as it existed
before Jackson reached the Court of Appeals in 1991. The rule
required a per se reversal of a conviction if the prosecution
withheld prior statements by government witnesses, regardless
of their content or the state's good faith. In each of these cases,
the court declined to discuss the procedures through which the
claims were raised. Furthermore, in no instance did the court
consider the status of any defendant's direct appeal material to
its decision." The court was consistent in its application of a
per se standard of review; prejudice was assumed.
" Id. at 552 n.4, 517 N.E.2d at 868 n.4, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 56 n.4.
78 Id. at 553, 517 N.E.2d at 869, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 57.
71 Id.; see also People v. Perez 65 N.Y.2d 154, 480 N.E.2d 361, 490 N.Y.S.2d
747 (1985); People v. Poole, 48 N.Y.2d 144, 397 N.E.2d 697, 422 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1979)
(disclosure of prior statements mandatory but defense may not have unfettered
access to prosecution's files).
" In general, by the time a case reached the Court of Appeals, the existence
of the material had already been determined. The court's decision turned on either
the definition of Rosario material or possible exceptions to the rule. See supra
notes 49-53. The fact that the prosecution regarded the mechanism for raising the
claim as immaterial can be inferred by its acquiescence in stipulating to the viola-
tion in order to expand the record and have the matter addressed directly by an
appellate court. By doing so, the prosecution avoided the CPL § 440.10 hearing by
the trial court. See People v. Young, 79 N.Y.2d 365, 591 N.E.2d 1163, 582
N.Y.S.2d 977 (1992). This stipulation saved the courts and prosecution time and
resources by eliminating the hearing stage from the process. It also indicates that
the prosecution did not consider the means by which the claim was raised as
relevant to Rosario or its per se standard.
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A. The First Trial and Appeal
On August 2, 1978, six firefighters perished while battling
a fire at a Waldbaum's supermarket in Brooklyn, New York.
The firefighters were on the store's roof when it collapsed,
sending them to their deaths." The fire was characterized as
the worst tragedy in the history of the New York Fire Depart-
ment."3 Initial reports from the fire department suggested
that the fire had been set deliberately.' This conclusion was
drawn from signs that there were multiple points of the fire's
origin, a fact that indicated arson. In addition, the fire
department's report stated that the fires began downstairs and
burned upwards.85 This view, however, was not universally
held. A Police Department Arson Division Detective, Harold
Dugan, was of the opinion that the fires began just below the
"1 Despite this Comment's focus on the procedural aspects of Jackson, an
extensive discussion of the facts is necessary for an understanding of the possible
scope of Rosario violations and the impact that they can have on trial strategies
and verdicts. While most Rosario violations are not as egregious as Jackson, the
fact that even the most outrageous instances of misconduct may easily go
undetected raises the specter of other, improperly convicted defendants unnec-
essarily serving sentences. Thus, the extent of the Rosario violations in Jackson is
relevant to the larger question of the importance of the per se rule in ensuring
prosecutorial compliance with the discovery requirements delineated by CPL §
240.20 and the Rosario doctrine.
2 People v. Jackson, 65 N.Y.2d 265, 267, 480 N.E.2d 727, 729, 491 N.Y.S.2d
138, 140 (1985).
Appellants Brief at 2, People v. Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d 638, 585 N.E.2d 795,
578 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1991) (No. 135). It should be noted that the People were the
appellants in this case but mistakenly titled their brief "Respondent's Brief." The
prosecution's brief will hereinafter be referred to as "Appellant's Brief."
' Id. Note, however, that when Jackson was remanded to the trial court for a
determination of prejudice, the trial court observed that the police believed that
the Fire Department had planted evidence of arson and that this was known by
the prosecution. People v. Jackson, 154 Misc. 2d 718, 593 N.Y.S.2d 410 (Sup. Ct.
Kings County 1992). Police Arson Detective Harold Dugan said later in an out-of-
court interview,
We had information back in our office that there was an attempt to be
made to acquire for the widows [of the deceased firemen], the $50,000
federal crime victims' money. It was a belief held, perhaps by the fire
marshals, that a crime had to have been committed in order for that to
be possible.
60 Minutes: The Case Against Eric Jackson (CBS television broadcast, Apr. 30,
1989) (transcript on file with the Brooklyn Law Review) [hereinafter 60 Minutes].
' Jackson, 154 Misc. 2d at 721, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 412.
PEOPLE v. JACKSON1994] 1245
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
roof and burned downwards through the cockloft. 6 Because of
the unresolved contradictions between the two departments'
reports, the police kept the criminal investigation open.87
In March 1979, nine months after the fire, Julio Cruz, a
jail-house informant, told one of the Police Detectives investi-
gating the fire that Erick Jackson had admitted that he had
been paid to set the Waldbaum's fire." Cruz, an inmate at
Rikers Island House of Detention, claimed that he had over-
heard Jackson making this statement in October 1978 when
they both had been incarcerated at Rikers Island. 9 As a re-
sult of this information, the police brought Jackson to the
Brooklyn District Attorney's office for questioning. Over a two-
day period, Jackson made three statements to the police and
Assistant District Attorney Michael Gary," in which he ad-
mitted setting the fire at the supermarket by punching holes
in the roof, stuffing paper in the holes, and pouring the accel-
erant down through the holes into the store.91 Jackson also
discussed setting a similar fire at a Royal Farms Dairy store,
also located in Brooklyn.2 According to Jackson's statements,
86 The term "cockloft" refers to a space above the ceiling of the store but below
the roof. Id. Dugan was not entirely consistent on this point in his prior state-
ments. In his grand jury testimony Dugan said he did not know the cause of the
fire. However, Dugan later provided memoranda to the effect that he believed that
the Fire Department fabricated the arson evidence for insurance purposes and
later stated that he believed the fire had been caused by an electrical short. Id.
87 Although there were at least two different government agencies investigating
the fire, there apparently was very little teamwork involved. There were reports of
acrimony between the police investigators and the fire marshals. Brooklyn District
Attorney Gold was quoted as saying the marshals had "'hindered' the investiga-
tion," and "were otherwise 'uncooperative.'" Josh Barbanel, Brooklyn Man Convict-
ed in Blaze in Which 6 Firefighters Died in '78, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 2, 1980, at D23.
This may have been the normal state of relations between the police and fire
departments, but there may have been other factors as well. See supra note 84.
8 People v. Jackson, 65 N.Y.2d at 267, 480 N.E.2d at 729, 491 N.Y.S.2d at
140.
89 Id.
9 The fact that Gary handled the interrogation of Jackson is relevant since he
later testified regarding Jackson's confession. In addition, Gary was the author of
an internal memorandum that was later found to be Brady material, and he testi-
fied at the CPL § 440.10 hearing in 1988. See Jackson, 142 Misc. 2d 853, 538
N.Y.S.2d 677 (1988). Finally, Gary's handling of the investigation and confession
was the centerpiece of Erick Jackson's 1994 retrial. See Jan Hoffnan, Two Trials
Later, Mystery Lingers in Arson Case, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1994, at 45; Daniel
Wise, Judge Recounts Prosecutor Role at Previous Arson-Murder Trial, N.Y. L.J.,
Aug. 11, 1994, at 1.
"' Jackson, 154 Misc. 2d at 720, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 412.
92 Id. The Royal Farms store Jackson had discussed was in Coney Island,
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neither he nor his two accomplices were ever inside the
store.93 Following an unsuccessful suppression hearing, the
case moved to trial. 4
1. Jackson's First Trial
At trial the prosecution presented two arson experts who,
at times, gave conflicting testimony.95 Former Fire Marshall
Charles King testified that the fire had been intentionally
started at four different points within the store. According to
King, one fire began in the men's bathroom and three others
started in unconnected points beneath the stairs leading to the
store's mezzanine." King testified that the critical fire-the
one started in the men's room-burned upward through a
beam in the bathroom.9" King also stated that it was not pos-
sible for the fire to have been started by someone throwing ac-
celerant onto the beam from outside the building.98
Although King's testimony indicated that the fire was ar-
son, his version of how the fire started did not correspond to
Jackson's confession. In King's opinion, the evidence showed
that an accelerant had been used, a claim the People bolstered
by introducing an empty turpentine canister that had been
found under the mezzanine stairs.9 King's version of the
events suggested that the arsonist had entered the building,
set the fires on the lower floors with an accelerant and then
left.' Even if King's testimony did not corroborate Jackson's
Brooklyn, a considerable distance from the Waldbaum's located in Sheepshead Bay,
Brooklyn.
93 Id.
" At his pretrial suppression hearing, Jackson raised the issue of whether he
consented to being questioned on one of the dates where no "Damiani" order had
been produced. (A "Damiani order" is a procedure by which the district attorney
takes custody of an inmate at Rikers Island, with the inmate's consent, so the
district attorney's office can interview the inmate and return him to Rikers Island
on the same day). The trial court found that there was probable cause to question
Jackson and that he had consented to being questioned. Id.
's Appellant's Brief, supra note 83, at 4-6.
's Appellants Brief, supra note 83, at 4-6.
', Appellant's Brief, supra note 83, at 4-6.
Appellant's Brief, supra note 83, at 4-6.
" Brief for Defendant-Respondent at 2-3, People v. Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d 638,
585 N.E.2d 795, 578 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1991) (No. 135).
" This is an interpretation shared by both parties. See Appellants Brief, supra
note 83, at 4-6; Brief for Defendant-Respondent, supra note 99, at 2-3.
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confession, it conclusively posited arson as the cause of the
fire.
The government's second expert witness, Detective Dugan,
presented a very different analysis of the fire. Dugan testified
that he did not believe that any of the fire's points of origin
were located beneath the stairs.'' Rather, Dugan identified
the point of origin as being just below the roof, above the beam
in the cockloft. 112 Further contradicting King, Dugan testified
that the fire had burned down from that point of origin to the
beam in the men's room.' 3 Although Dugan did not testify to
the cause of the fire, his testimony corresponded more with
Jackson's confession than had King's analysis, since Dugan
placed the origin just under the roof and attributed the blaze
in the store to a "drop fire."0 4
While the two experts' testimony was incongruous at
times, each could corroborate parts of Jackson's confession. The
prosecution relied on Fire Marshal King to bolster Jackson's
admission that he had started the fire. Yet, because King's
theory about the fire's path conflicted with Jackson's confes-
sion, the prosecution urged the jury to utilize Dugan's theory
about the point of origin for the fire and discount King's con-
trary hypothesis.' 5 Thus, King's testimony showed the fire
... Appellant's Brief, supra note 83, at 4.
103 Appellant's Brief, supra note 83, at 4.
103 Appellant's Brief, supra note 83, at 4.
"' Appellant's Brief, supra note 83, at 4. It is understandable that Dugan
would not testify as to the cause of the fire. The prosecution knew that Dugan did
not think the fire was arson and they certainly would not want to have him dis-
cuss his doubts. The defense, unaware of Dugan's previously stated opinion, proba-
bly assumed that he would say that the fire was caused by arson. It also should
be noted that Jackson's trial attorney may not have provided adequate assistance
of counsel, possibly resulting in an ineffective cross-examination. See infra note
110.
At the CPL § 440.10 hearing Dugan testified that at least one of the fires
had been set after the main fire was extinguished. He testified that the can of
turpentine which Fire Marshal King claimed was used in setting the original fire,
was in "pristine condition." Yet, had the can been subject to any heat, it would
have burst. He further testified that had the can been present during the primary
fire, the firefighters would "definitely" have removed it. Jackson, 154 Misc. 2d at
720-22, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 412-13; Brief for Defendant-Respondent, supra note 99, at
19 (citing Hearing Minutes at 499-505, Jackson (No. 93-031)).
10" This conclusion is not explicitly posited by the court but is easily deduced
from the court's presentation of the trial. 154 Misc. 2d at 720-22, 593 N.Y.S.2d at
412-13; see also Appellant's Brief, supra note 83, at 4-5.
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was arson and Dugan's confirmed that the fire had begun on or
near the roof and burned downwards.
The government called other witnesses, including Michael
Gary who, as the transcriber of Jackson's confession, intro-
duced it into evidence." 6 The prosecution also called Julio
Cruz, who testified to Jackson's jalhouse admissions.'
Finally, after a motion to dismiss the charges was de-
nied, O8 the defense rested without introducing any evidence
or calling any witnesses.0 9 Jackson's attorney relied strictly
on cross examination and summation to defend Jackson on the
six murder counts."0
In closing, defense counsel argued that when he confessed,
Jackson was referring not to the fire at Waldbaum's but to
another fire entirely."' The defense did not dispute that the
Walbaum's fire was arson. Instead, counsel argued that Jack-
son was not the person who had set the fire. The defense tried
to persuade the jury that first, Cruz's testimony was a fabrica-
tion that he had concocted to reduce his own sentence,"' and
second, that Dugan's testimony should be given little weight
since he had not visited the crime scene."' Finally, the de-
1"0 Jackson, 154 Misc. 2d at 718-20, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 412; see also supra note
90.
107 Appellants Brief, supra note 83, at 3.
"" The motion was based on the conflicting testimony of two arson experts. The
court denied the motion, finding that the inconsistency was a question for the jury
and was reconcilable. People v. Jackson, 65 N.Y.2d 265, 274, 480 N.E.2d 727, 732-
33, 491 N.Y.S.2d 138, 144 (1985).
1 Appellants Brief, supra note 83, at 5.
"0 Appellant's Brief, supra note 83, at 5. Although the strategic decisions were
formed, in part, by the materials available to defense counsel at the time, there
was some question concerning the quality of Jackson's defense. Robert Sullivan,
who represented Jackson during his motion to appeal, said that "John Corbett
(Jackson's original lawyer at trial) billed the system for three hours of investiga-
tion on this case." 60 Minutes, supra note 84, This seems wholly inadequate in a
murder trial involving a complicated fire and six counts of murder in the indict-
ment. At the time of the CPL § 440.10 hearing, the trial court indicated its dis-
pleasure with defense counsel's performance at trial, but declined to consider the
issue since the matter was settled on Rosario and Brady grounds. Jackson, 154
Misc. 2d at 735, 593 N.Y.S.2d 422 ("The Court is extremely troubled by what it
has learned of counsel's performance in this case. However, in light of the Brady
and Rosario issues, the Court will not decide this issue.").
. Appellants Brief, supra note 83, at 5.
1 Appellant's Brief, supra note 83, at 5; see also Jackson, 154 Misc. 2d at 727-
28, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 416-17.
1' Appellants Brief, supra note 83, at 5.
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fense insisted that King's testimony was more reliable than
Dugan's."4 The strategy was to convince the jurors that
while the fire might have been arson it could not have hap-
pened the way the prosecution had claimed. On December 1,
1980 the jury convicted Jackson of six counts of felony murder
and one count of second degree arson."5 He was sentenced to
150 years in jail."'
Jackson moved to set aside the verdict claiming insuffi-
ciency of evidence and newly discovered evidence." 7 The new
evidence revealed that Cruz was a minor at the time of
Jackson's alleged statement to him and, as such, could not
have been in the section of Rikers Island that housed Jackson.
Thus, it would have been physically impossible for Cruz and
Jackson to have been together at any one time.1' 8 Judge
Slavin denied the motion, ruling that there was enough evi-
dence for the jury to convict and that Cruz's age was known
and available during trial and therefore was not newly discov-
ered evidence." 9 The Appellate Division affirmed without
opinion."'
2. The Court of Appeals Considers Jackson
Jackson appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals on
three grounds: 1) the trial court's denial of the newly discov-
ered evidence claim was an abuse of discretion; 2) his state-
ments were a product of an illegal seizure and so were inad-
missible; and 3) his guilt had not been established beyond a
"' Appellant's Brief, supra note 83, at 5-6.
115 Jackson, 154 Misc. 2d at 718, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 410.
116 Brief for Defendant-Respondent, supra note 99, at 11; see also Jackson, 103
A.D.2d 1047, 479 N.Y.S.2d 390 (2d Dep't 1984).
117 People v. Jackson, 65 N.Y.2d at 269, 480 N.E.2d at 727, 491 N.Y.S.2d at
141.
It seems there is no doubt that Cruz and Jackson could not have been in-
carcerated in the same section of Rikers Island. Under Correction Law §§ 485 and
500-c, minors and adults can neither be lodged together in the same building nor
eat together in the same facility. Jackson, 65 N.Y.2d 265, 480 N.E.2d at 730, 491
N.Y.S.2d 138. Daniel O'Neill, general office captain at Rikers Island, while discuss-
ing the separation policies for adults and minors, stated: "I personally don't believe
[the conversation] could have taken place." 60 Minutes, supra note 84.
... Jackson, 65 N.Y.2d at 269, 480 N.E.2d at 730, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 141.
12 Jackson, 103 A.D.2d 1047, 479 N.Y.S.2d 390 (2d Dep't 1981).
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reasonable doubt.'2' The court concluded that since the first
claim was without merit and the second not reviewable, 2' it
would discuss only the third ground for appeal."
The court affirmed Jackson's conviction, finding that a
question of conflicting testimony could be resolved by a
jury." Hence, the jury could find Jackson guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt."5 The court examined the evidence pre-
sented at trial and found that the "[d]efendant's three state-
ments to the authorities place him on the roof, making holes in
it which were stuffed with paper and upon which an accelerant
was then poured and lighted, and his admission to Cruz con-
firms his participation in setting the fire."126 Corroboration of
the confession, the court held, "need only be of circumstances
'calculated to suggest the commission of crime, and for the
explanation of which the confession furnishes the key.'""
Thus, the court held that there was sufficient evidence before
the jury to corroborate Jackson's confessions which, in turn,
could enable the jury to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
With this decision, Jackson had exhausted his direct appeal.
121 Jackson, 65 N.Y.2d at 269, 480 N.E.2d at 730, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 141.
1" The court found that the facts surrounding Cruz's age and location were
readily available prior to trial. The court also determined that the issue of admis-
sibility of Jackson's statements was not one of probable cause but consent. Since
the trial court had found consent and this finding was affrmned by the intermedi-
ate appellate court, the Court of Appeals ruled that the issue was beyond their
scope of authority for review. Id. at 269-70 nn.3-4, 480 N.E.2d at 730 nn.3-4, 491
N.Y.S.2d at 141 nn.3-4.
12 Id. at 269-70, 480 N.E.2d at 730, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 141.
124 The court found that although convictions could not be sustained if they
were based on "the testimony of a single witness which is involved in hopeless
contradiction," this case presented conflicting testimony which went to reasonable
doubt, not insufficient evidence. Id. at 270, 480 N.E.2d at 730-31, 491 N.Y.S.2d at
141.
2 The court concluded that "if there is no evidence upon which a reasonable
mind might fairly conclude guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the motion must be
granted." Id at 272, 480 N.E.2d at 732, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 143.
126 Id.
- Id. at 273, 480 N.E.2d at 732, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 143 (quoting People v.
Murray, 40 N.Y.2d 327, 332, 353 N.E.2d 605, 386 N.Y.S.2d 691, 695 (1976)).
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B. Rosario and CPL Section 440.10: The Court of Appeals
Revisited
1. The Motion to Vacate
While Erick Jackson appealed his conviction, a separate
civil action was underway. The suit was brought by the widows
of the deceased firefighters against the City of New York and
Waldbaum's. 28 The plaintiffs were represented by Robert
Sullivan, a well-known personal injury lawyer.'29 During dis-
covery, Sullivan came across memoranda that had not been
given to Jackson's defense counsel, leading Sullivan to believe
that Jackson had been wrongly convicted.13 Based on that
information, and his own opinions as to the fairness and accu-
racy of the conviction, Sullivan, who had never tried a criminal
case, decided to help Jackson pursue a reversal.'31
In 1988, three years after the appellate court's ruling
against him, Jackson moved to vacate his conviction on the
grounds that exculpatory, or Brady, material132 had been
withheld from the defense and that he had received ineffective
assistance of counsel. 3 The trial court informed both parties
that consideration also would be given to any Rosario viola-
tions. The court then examined the prosecution's files to deter-
mine if they had complied with Rosario prior to Jackson's trial
and found that there was at least one violation."3 The court's
decision did not discuss the violation in detail, noting only that
during the hearing the prosecution conceded that a memoran-
dum dated March 26, 1979, had not been provided to defense
"2 The case was settled out of court five weeks into trial for $13.5 million. The
city's portion of the settlement was about $300,000. Mary A. Giordano, PI Expert
Makes Bid to Clear Arsonist, MANHATTAN LAW., Aug. 2, 1988, at 1.
129 Id.
.30 Sullivan has told interviewers that he found 18 statements, taken by the
police from eyewitnesses to the fire, contradicting the prosecution's case. The grand
jury testimony of an F.B.I. arson specialist concluded that the fire was not arson.
In addition, there were memoranda from former assistant district attorneys who
declined to prosecute because they believed that the evidence did not warrant a
conviction. Id.; see also 60 Minutes, supra note 84.
... 60 Minutes, supra note 84.
132 See supra note 49.
13" People v. Jackson, 142 Misc. 2d 853, 538 N.Y.S.2d 677 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1988).
134 Id.
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counsel.'35 The memorandum contained a synopsis of an in-
terview between Fire Marshal King and then-Assistant District
Attorney Gary. Since King had testified at Jackson's initial
trial, the document was considered Rosario material. 136 The
court did not discuss the contents of the memorandum, or the
existence of any other undisclosed materials. Instead it turned
to a consideration of the appropriate standard of review for a
Rosario violation raised in a collateral motion. The court con-
cluded that the violation carried a per se standard and there-
fore necessitated an automatic reversal. 37
In explaining its reasoning the trial court observed that
while Rosario violations received per se reversals on direct
appeals, two courts had determined that post-judgment ap-
peals required only a harmless error analysis. 38 In examin-
ing these cases, however, the court found that one of the cases,
People v. Howard,19 had since been rendered moot by subse-
quent Court of Appeals cases, and the other case, People v.
Mancuso," had been wrongly decided.'' The trial court
understood the Court of Appeals' position to be that Rosario-
based CPL section 440.10 motions to vacate maintained per se
reversal status, despite the absence of a direct appeal. 42
Since the People conceded that a Rosario violation had oc-
curred, Jackson's conviction required vacatur. 43 On June 4,
1990, the Appellate Division affirmed the reversal.' The
District Attorney's office then appealed to the Court of Ap-
peals.
'as Id.
136 Id.
1- Id. at 856, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 679. The court addressed the contents of this
memorandum, and other Rosario materials, when the case was returned to the
trial court on remand. Jackson, 154 Misc. 2d at 724, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 414-15.
... Jackson, 142 Misc. 2d at 854, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 677.
1- 127 A.D.2d 109, 513 N.Y.S.2d 973 (1st Dep't 1987).
10 141 Misc. 2d 382, 532 N.Y.S.2d 643 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1988).
141 Jackson, 142 Misc. 2d at 854-55, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 678.
142 Id. at 854, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 677.
1 Id. at 856, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 679.
14 People v. Jackson, 162 A.D.2d 470, 556 N.Y.S.2d 165 (2d Dep't 1990).
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2. The Court of Appeals Reconsiders Rosario
a. The Majority Opinion
On December 19, 1991, the Court of Appeals reversed the
lower courts' decision and remanded the case to the trial court
for a hearing on the prejudicial impact of the Rosario viola-
tion.'45 The basis for the holding was that the lower courts
had incorrectly applied a per se standard for reversal to a post-
appeal motion to vacate. The court found that, when the
defendant's direct appeal had been exhausted, the language of
CPL section 440.10 required that particular prejudice had to be
established to merit a vacatur of the verdict.'46
The court stated that its previous decisions touching on
Rosario had never determined the standard of review for viola-
tions under CPL section 440.10 motions to vacate, noting that
its decisions were always based on claims brought on direct ap-
peal.'47 Although the trial court had read the Court of Ap-
peals decision in People v. Novoa 48 as requiring a per se re-
versal even when the claim was raised in a collateral motion,
the Court of Appeals asserted that for procedural purposes the
claim in Novoa had been considered heard on direct ap-
peal.'49 Starting with this historical construction, the court
determined that Jackson should be treated as a case of first
impression. 50
" People v. Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d 638, 585 N.E.2d 795, 578 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1991).
146 Id. at 641, 585 N.E.2d at 797, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 485.
147 Id.
1- 70 N.Y.2d 490, 517 N.E.2d 219, 522 N.Y.S.2d 504 (1987).
1"9 Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d at 641, 585 N.E.2d at 797, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 485. In
Novoa, the Rosario claim was raised while the direct appeal was pending. The
trial court denied the defendant's CPL § 440.10 motion. The intermediate appellate
court affirmed both the conviction and the denial of the CPL § 440.10 motion.
People v. Novoa, 124 A.D.2d 1078, 508 N.Y.S.2d 132 (1st Dep't 1986). When the
Court of Appeals heard the case on appeal, both the verdict and the collateral
motion were considered as though the issues had been consolidated and so the
CPL § 440.10 motion was treated as though it was raised on direct appeal. Novoa,
70 N.Y.2d 490, 517 N.E.2d 219, 522 N.Y.S.2d 504. The court's contention that this
consolidation was for procedural purposes is misleading. The procedural process re-
quired the court to hear them together because they had been heard jointly by the
intermediate appellate court. But the court did not opt to create a procedural ex-
ception in Novoa. In fact, the court did not enter into any form of discussion con-
cerning the fact that the Rosario claim was brought more than a year after the
verdict and was initially raised as a collateral motion. Id.
1"0 "Thus, the question before the court today is indeed a novel one." Jackson,
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The court's reasoning began with the finding that since
Jackson's claim was made in the context of CPL section 440.10,
it was subject to the limitations of the statute. 5' The court
also determined that the legislature's inclusion of the word
"prejudice" in the statute indicated that the legislature had
been concerned with the need for finality, and so required a
determination that the error had harmed the defendant.
152
According to the court, the statutory necessity for a showing of
prejudice created a conflict between the harmless error analy-
sis implicit in CPL section 440.10(1)(f) and the common-law
per se standard for Rosario claims raised on direct appeal. Rec-
ognizing that the disparate standards of review could lead to
discordant treatment of otherwise similarly situated defen-
dants,153 the court sought to integrate the two standards in a
78 N.Y.2d at 641, 585 N.E.2d at 797, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 485.
... Id. at 645, 585 N.E.2d at 799, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 487. The court discussed
various subsections in which a Rosario violation could be grounded, and concluded
that subsection (1)(f) was the most appropriate. Id. New York's CPL provides for a
reversal when "improper and prejudicial conduct not appearing in the record oc-
curred during a trial resulting in the judgment which conduct, if it had appeared
in the record, would have required a reversal of the judgment upon an appeal
therefrom." N.Y. CIM. PROC. L. § 440.10.
112 Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d at 641, 585 N.E.2d at 797, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 485. The
court appeared to assume that the prejudice requirement was included in the
statute to prevent judgments from being overturned on the basis of an inconse-
quential, non-constitutional error. Thus, when a defendant cannot show that the
error in question had an impact on the verdict, the need for finality of judgments
requires that the judgment stand. The key ingredient in this logical chain is the
existence of prejudice or harm to the defendant. Inherent in the majority's holding
is the opinion that the statute demands a case-specific showing by the defendant
of individualized prejudice resulting from the particular error. Reading this partic-
ular necessity into the statute allowed the Jackson majority to create the harmless
error analysis standard for post-appeal CPL § 440.10 motions based on Rosario
violations. The Jackson holding implicitly states that the court's prior holdings,
which precluded the harmless error approach, were purely policy decisions. The
problem with this reasoning is that the prior holdings appeared to say that the
harmless error analysis approach was simply inapplicable given the nature of a
Rosario violation. Thus, the majority's belief that the prejudice requirement of CPL
§ 440.10 can be satisfied on a case-by-case basis is at odds with the Rosario chain
of cases. See, e.g., Novoa, 70 N.Y.2d at 499, 517 N.E.2d at 224, 522 N.Y.S.2d at
509 ("this court has not deviated from the principle that harmless error analysis is
inappropriate with respect to Rosario violations"); see also supra text accompanying
notes 54-80.
1.. The disparity exists when two defendants suffer Rosario violations, but one
defendant's violation is in the record and the other's is not. The first defendant is
entitled to a per se reversal if he can establish the violation on appeal. The sec-
ond defendant would have to meet the additional burden of proving prejudice at
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decision it claimed was driven by policy considerations.""
The court determined that the policy of finality outweighed
the discovery rights protected by Rosario and that CPL section
440.10(1)(f) compelled a particularized demonstration of prej-
udice by defendants asserting Rosario claims.'55 To eliminate
the disparate standards of review for cases that were still in
the pre-appeal stage, the court held that the harmless error
standard of review would become applicable only after the
defendant's appeal had been decided.'56 The courts, therefore,
would use the per se standard when a CPL section 440.10 mo-
tion was decided prior to the determination of the defendant's
appeal. After the appeal was decided, the CPL section 440.10
motion was to be subjected to a harmless error analysis. Ac-
cordingly, the court reversed and remanded the case to the
trial court for a hearing to determine the extent of the preju-
dice resulting from the violations.'57
b. The Dissent's Critique
In a bitterly, or at least sharply, divergent opinion, the
three-member dissent contended that settled case law required
the per se standard for Rosario claims to be applied for all
Rosario violations, regardless of the mechanism used to bring
the issue before a court.'58 In the dissent's view, the post-
Rosario chain of cases established that Rosario violations are
prejudicial per se, and as a result, the statutory requirement of
prejudice is satisfied once a defendant can prove that the viola-
tion occurred.'59
his CPL § 440.10 hearing. This latter scenario is similar to that in People v.
Novoa, 70 N.Y.2d 490, 517 N.E.2d 219, 522 N.Y.S.2d 504 (1987).
15 Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d at 641, 585 N.E.2d at 797, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 485.
155 Id. at 641, 585 N.E.2d at 797, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 485.
156 Id. at 649, 585 N.E.2d at 802, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 490.
.s The trial court had not previously addressed the potential Brady violation or
ineffective assistance of counsel charge at the prior CPL § 440.10 hearing because
the Rosario violation had preempted further judicial review. The Court of Appeals
instructed the trial court to re-examine these claims, in addition to determining
the degree of harm caused by the Rosario violation. Id. at 650, 585 N.E.2d at 803,
578 N.Y.S.2d at 491.
1 Id. at 660, 585 N.E.2d at 809, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 497 (Titone, J., dissenting).
s' The Rosario chain quoted by both the majority and dissent included People
v. Jones, 70 N.Y.2d 547, 517 N.E.2d 865, 523 N.Y.S.2d 53, (1987); People v.
Novoa, 70 N.Y.2d 490, 517 N.E.2d 219, 522 N.Y.S.2d 504, (1987); People v.
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According to the dissent, the majority's reasoning was
based not on a reading of the language in CPL section 440.10,
but rather on an arbitrary statutory reconstruction reflecting
the majority's personal views. 6 ' Furthermore, the dissent ar-
gued, since the court previously had determined that the
harmless error analysis was inapplicable to Rosario violations
as a matter of policy, there was no reason to believe that this
standard of review should become applicable in post-conviction
or post-appeal settings.'' Thus, the dissent claimed, the ma-
jority had supplanted the policy of fairness in the adjudicative
process with its preference for protecting convictions from per
se reversals.6 2
In the dissent's view, the majority had mistakenly con-
strued the policy question as one of whether the Rosario doc-
trine should be available for CPL section 440.10 motions. The
actual policy issue before the court, however, was whether the
per se standard should be available for Rosario violations. This
question, the dissent concluded, had already been decided in
the post-Rosario chain of cases.6 3
Finally, the dissent opined that if societal policies are the
touchstone of Jackson, the majority ought to have considered
the impact of its holding. The dissent asserted that the majori-
ty's ruling would deter prosecutorial compliance and substan-
tially narrow the general applicability of the Rosario doc-
Ranghelle, 69 N.Y.2d 56, 503 N.E.2d 1011, 511 N.Y.S.2d 580 (1986); and People v.
Consolazio, 40 N.Y.2d 446, 354 N.E.2d 801, 387 N.Y.S.2d 62 (1976). See supra
notes 48-80 and accompanying text for a discussion of those cases. The majority
and dissent agreed that the above cases required a per se reversal for violations
addressed through direct appeal. The dissent, however, disagreed with the
majority's reasoning that the logic behind the per se ruling was inoperative in
cases involving collateral attacks.
1" "[The holding] must be premised solely on what the majority terms a choice
of 'policy'-the majority's current code word for its four members' unwillingness to
apply a well-settled rule of law in such a way as to produce vacaturs of previously
settled convictions." Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d at 655, 585 N.E.2d at 805, 578 N.Y.S.2d
at 494 (Titone, J., dissenting). The dissent further criticized the majority's ap-
proach, saying "the present majority's rationale is nothing more than an exercise
in result-directed statutory construction that simply does not withstand scrutiny."
Id. at 652, 585 N.E.2d at 804, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 492. See infra note 221 for a fur-
ther discussion of the dissent's criticism.
161 Jackson at 653-55, 585 N.E.2d at 804-06, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 492-94 (Titone, J.,
dissenting).
1 Id. at 654, 585 N.E.2d at 805, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 493.
' Id. at 652 n.1, 585 N.E.2d at 804 n.1, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 492 n.1.
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trine."6 In its conclusion, the dissent voiced its opposition to
the majority's approach to judicial decisionmaking. The dissent
understood the majority's approach to be one that preferred
policy considerations to logic and precedent, and feared that
this method raised the possibility of sudden departure from
precedent based on "nothing more than a change in prevailing
judicial sentiment."'65
3. Jackson on Remand: A Harmful-Error Analysis
On remand, the trial court found that both the Rosario
and Brady violations had caused Jackson harm and, again, set
aside the verdict.'66 The court chose not to examine the inef-
fective assistance of counsel issue.'67 The court's opinion de-
lineated the withheld materials-many of which were both
Brady and Rosario material-and discussed how they might
have affected the defense's strategy at trial. Based on its re-
view of the case, the court concluded that Erick Jackson had
suffered more than just an error-fraught trial.'68
Specifically, the court found that the prosecution had with-
held a wide array of evidence and statements from defense
counsel. Some of the materials that the prosecution had been
directly aware of included: Detective Dugan's opinion that the
fire was electrical in nature and that the fire department had
set the three minor fires; 69 the March 26, 1979, memoran-
dum, which had been the basis for the court's initial granting
164 Id. at 658-60, 585 N.E.2d at 808-09, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 496-97.
1 Id. at 659, 585 N.E.2d at 808, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 496-97.
16 Jackson, 154 Misc. 2d 718, 735-36, 593 N.Y.S.2d 410, 422 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1992).
1 Id. Although the court's stated reason for by-passing the charge of ineffective
assistance of counsel was that it was not necessary, this decision probably was
related to the fact that the original trial lawyer, John Corbett, had died. 60 Min-
utes, supra note 84; see also supra note 110.
16 Jackson, 154 Misc. 2d at 735-36, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 422.
169 Id. at 723-24, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 413-14. What is most interesting is that an
assistant district attorney ("ADA") took notes of Dugan's interviews and then de-
stroyed them. Id. In fact, the (former) ADA testified that he always destroyed his
notes after talking with either police officers or fire investigators. Id. This raises
the possibility of untold convictions tainted by the intentional destruction of
Rosario material. Destroying notes of interviews with potential state witnesses is
an act in direct contravention to the due diligence required by Rosario.
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of Jackson's CPL section 440.10 motion;170 and a memoran-
dum dated February 25, 1980, from Assistant District Attorney
Weininger to then-Assistant District Attorney Aiello regarding
Cruz's confession.' The documents constituting Brady mate-
rial involved a memorandum from Assistant District Attorney
Besunder to Assistant District Attorney Lasky disclosing that
just prior to the fire a construction worker on the roof of the
store had not seen flame, smoke, or holes in the roof.72 The
memorandum also stated that none of the prosecution's experts
believed that the fire could have lain dormant prior to being
discovered. 73
The court then examined different strategies the defense
could have used if it had been aware that not only had one
expert believed the fire was not arson, but also had known
that the other expert's opinion was based upon fabricated evi-
dence. The court also discussed the possibility of a different
verdict had the court known that one of the prosecutors had
destroyed notes that constituted Rosario material.74 The
court believed that the defense clearly would have altered its
trial strategy if it had known this information. 75 Thus, based
upon the combination of the destroyed notes regarding Dugan's
expert opinion and the memorandum concerning the fire
marshal's report, the court concluded that a reasonable possi-
17 Id. at 724, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 414.
171 The Weininger memorandum discusses Cruz's belief that Jackson may have
been speaking about the other fire he claimed to have set, not the Waldbaum's
fire. Id. at 724-25, 593 N.Y.S. 2d at 414. In an interesting aside, Aiello later be-
came a judge on the New York Supreme Court and was the trial judge for a post-
Jackson case, People v. Robles 153 Misc. 2d 859, 583 N.Y.S.2d 138 (Sup. Ct.
Kings County 1992). See infra notes 302-05 and accompanying text.
172 To help illustrate the distinction between Brady and Rosario material, this
memorandum was Brady material because it tended to exculpate. It was not
Rosario material because the construction worker did not testify at trial. See supra
notes 49-51 for a more detailed discussion of Brady.
173 Jackson, 154 Misc. 2d at 725, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 415. If the fire had in fact
been started by Jackson punching holes in the roof and pouring accelerant through
the holes, then the worker should have seen the holes themselves and smoke from
the fire coming up through the holes. Since the fire could not have lain dormant,
the worker's statements contradicted Jackson's confession and Fire Marshall King's
testimony. See supra text accompanying notes 99-103.
17. The trial court was clearly upset by the destruction of the notes. The court
noted that had if it been aware of the destruction at the time of the original trial
it would have sanctioned the lawyer. Jackson, 154 Misc. 2d at 734, 593 N.Y.S.2d
at 421.
171 Id. at 732, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 420.
19941 1259
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
bility existed that the Rosario violations had affected the result
of the trial. 7 6 On June 12, 1992, Jackson's conviction was va-
cated.'77 Five months later the appellate court affirmed this
decision. 7 '
4. Epilogue: Retrial and Acquittal
In August of 1994, Erick Jackson was tried again. He was
acquitted of all charges.'79 Given the lengthy public history of
Erick Jackson's case, it was not surprising that the case re-
ceived a great deal of local publicity.' The second trial, dif-
fered dramatically from the first. In contrast to John Corbett,
Robert Sullivan presented an aggressive defense. For example,
he called former assistant district attorney, now judge, Michael
Gary, to the stand to question him about a falsified statement
which had been shown to another witness.' Fire Marshall
King also testified, stating that he had told prosecutors sixteen
years ago that "they had the wrong man."8 2 In the end, the
jury simply could not find any evidence to corroborate
Jackson's confessions and acquitted him altogether.8 ' For the
first time since his arrest, more than fifteen years earlier,
Erick Jackson was a free man.
III. ANALYSIS
The Court of Appeal's decision in Jackson is problematic
both in its legal reasoning and its result. Viewed in its histori-
178 Id. at 734, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 421.
Id. at 736, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 422.
178 People v. Jackson, 198 A.D.2d 301, 603 N.Y.S.2d 558 (2d Dep't 1993).
... As the case resulted in an acquittal, there is no slip opinion and the records
are sealed. The case was tried in Kings County before Acting Supreme Court
Justice Gerald Beblock under the indictment number 1850/79.
18 See, e.g., Joseph P. Fried, Judge Is Assailed in Waldbaum Fire Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 11, 1994, at B3; Joseph P. Fried, An Old Case of Arson Set for Retri-
al, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 1994, at 35; Ellis Henican, A Case Goes Up in Flames,
NEWSDAY, July 31, 1994, at 8.
... Judge Recounts Prosecutor Role at Previous Arson-Murder Trial, N.Y. L.J.,
Aug. 11, 1994, at 2.
8 Simple Phrase Frees Defendant: You've Got the Wrong Man, BERGEN RECORD,
Aug. 19, 1994, at A8; Hoffman, supra note 90, at 45.
1 Joseph P. Fried, On Retrial, Suspect Is Acquitted in Fire that Killed 6 in '78,
N.Y. TI IES, Aug. 18, 1994, at Al.
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cal context, the Rosario doctrine is based on the inapplicability
of the harmless error standard of review for Rosario viola-
tions." The Jackson decision should have addressed the is-
sue of standard of review in terms of its relationship to
Rosario, without focusing on the differing types of appeals.
Such an approach would have led the court to extend the per
se standard of reversal to all Rosario cases, not just to those
heard on direct appeal. Instead, the court arrived at a decision
that is internally inconsistent and logically unpersuasive.
Moreover, the decision fails to advance the policy interests it is
purportedly based upon. Ultimately, Jackson can only lead to
results that the court has long-sought to prevent.
The final result of Jackson creates a new exception to
Rosario which undercuts the compliance features inherent in
the per se standard used in earlier cases. Since Rosario viola-
tions are caused by prosecutors' failures to meet their discov-
ery obligations, reducing the punitive aspect of the rule
discourages due care in compliance. Furthermore, reinstalling
the harmless error standard without definitive guidelines for
its application will necessarily generate dissimilar results for
similarly situated defendants. Thus, stripped of compelling
policy argument or legal basis, Jackson represents nothing
more than the court's preference not to reverse affirmed convic-
tions, even at the expense of well-settled law.
A. Rosario, Assumed Prejudice, and Illogical Reasoning
The majority's fundamental error in Jackson is its reliance
on a procedural device to determine which standard of review
should be applied. The issue that the court should have ad-
dressed was whether the harmless error standard could ever
be applied to Rosario violations.'85 Instead, the majority con-
' See, e.g., People v. Consolazio, 40 N.Y.2d 446, 454, 354 N.E.2d 801, 805, 387
N.Y.S.2d 62, 66 (1976) ("we thus reject arguments that consideration of the [undis-
closed statement] can result in a finding of harmless error"); People v. Jones, 70
N.Y.2d 547, 551-52, 517 N.E.2d 865, 868, 523 N.Y.S.2d 53, 56 (1987) (harmless
error too speculative to be applied to Rosario violations); People v. Novoa, 70
N.Y.2d 490, 499, 517 N.E.2d 219, 224, 522 N.Y.S.2d 504, 509 (1987) ("this court
has not deviated from the principle that harmless error analysis is inappropriate
with respect to Rosario violations").
" If the Jackson court had followed the settled doctrine of Rosario, the court
would have found that harmless error is simply inapplicable to Rosario. See supra
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cluded that the harmless error analysis was appropriate and
applicable only in some cases.186 By declining to find the per
se standard appropriate for Jackson, the court effectively inval-
idated the need for the per se standard in all Rosario situa-
tions. Simultaneously, the court continued to support a doc-
trine that holds harmless error inappropriate for all Rosario
situations. This legalistic self-negation resulted from the
court's deliberate shift in focus, a shift that allowed it to tacitly
discard the per se principle for collateral attacks.
If, in fact, the question squarely before the court was the
proper standard of review for Rosario in any instance, then the
court's focus on which mechanism brought the claim before the
court is either disingenuous or simply mistaken. While Jackson
may have been the first case in which the court directly ad-
dressed the appropriate standard of review for CPL section
440.10 motions, it is misleading to assert that this case is one
of first impression simply because the court had not yet explic-
itly ruled that the per se standard is applicable to CPL section
440.10 motions.8 ' The Rosario doctrine clearly delineates
that the per se standard is the only possible standard that
properly may be applied to a Rosario violation; not because
policy concerns mandate it, but because the nature of a
Rosario violation precludes the use of the harmless error stan-
dard. 88 Therefore, Jackson did not really present a "novel"
note 183.
" On the one hand, the Jackson court favorably discussed the court's per se
standard for Rosario, referring to the Rosario rule as "a deeply held belief that
simple fairness requires the defendant to be supplied with [Rosario material]."
Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d at 644, 585 N.E.2d at 799, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 487. In the next
breath, however, the majority stated, "we believe that a defendant raising a
Rosario claim by way of a CPL 440.10 motion must make a showing of prejudice.
We will not step in and cut off that inquiry. Neither our precedent nor our con-
cern for fairness to the defendant requires that result." Id. at 647, 585 N.E.2d at
801, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 489.
Id. at 638, 585 N.E.2d at 795, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 483.
" The dissent took issue with the majority's characterization of Jackson as
purely a policy question. The Rosario doctrine represented something more than
just a preference for a certain type of discovery obligation. Rosario represents an
interest in full disclosure of certain materials by the prosecution and the legal and
logical obstacles to determining the resultant harm of a failure by the prosecution
to satisfy this requirement. According to the dissent, reducing Rosario to a policy
issue subjected it, and other legal rules, to being obviated at any given time de-
pending on the whim of the court. Id. at 659-60, 585 N.E.2d at 809, 578 N.Y.S.2d
at 497 (Titone, J., dissenting).
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question at all. It simply offered the court an opportunity to
express its current position on Rosario in the context of a ques-
tion on harmless error and timeliness.'89
Avoiding this direct confrontation with Rosario successful-
ly allowed some of its members to evade a sensitive and con-
tentious issue. Yet doing so necessarily compelled an artificial
construction of the law by the court as it related to collateral
attacks and Rosario. This jurisprudential two-step forced the
majority into a holding that is untenable on either academic or
practical terms.9 ' The new Jackson exception to Rosario cre-
ated a host of internal inconsistencies that undercut the ana-
lytic persuasiveness of the majority's argument. In short, the
decision formulated a rule that, by its own logic, is invalid and
without intellectual integrity. When the holding is viewed
contextually, the only reasonable conclusion one can draw is
that the court should have either extended the per se standard
to all Rosario claims or eliminated it altogether. Hence, the
real question facing the court was whether to affirm or over-
turn Rosario in its present form, not how to "harmonize"
Rosario with CPL section 440.10.1''
1. Prejudice Per Se and a Satisfied Statute
An examination of the court's past Rosario decisions, as
well as other decisions employing the per se rule, clearly dem-
onstrate that Jackson should have recognized that the per se
rule applies to all Rosario violations, regardless of the proce-
dural vehicle employed. Because it is impossible to measure
"' As motions to vacate are not restricted by timeliness constraints, they con-
ceivably can be filed at any time after the conviction. Id. at 645, 585 N.E.2d at
799, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 487. Extending Rosario's per se standard to cover these mo-
tions would allow a defendant to obtain a reversal and a new trial any time after
a conviction.
1" Judging from post-Jackson cases, there were not enough votes on the bench
to divorce Rosario from the per se standard altogether. People v. Banch, 80 N.Y.2d
610, 608 N.E.2d 1069, 593 N.Y.S.2d 491 (1992) (affirming use of per se standard
for Rosario violations as the general rule by a six to one vote). By shifting the
focus from Rosario to the standard of review required by CPL § 440.10, the ma-
jority in Jackson made it possible to place a time limitation on Rosario without
forcing the bench to decide on Rosario in its totality. Thus, curbing Rosario was
made more palatable to members who may not have been comfortable directly
confronting the Rosario doctrine and stare decisis.
191 Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d at 648, 585 N.E.2d at 801, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 490.
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the impact of compliance failures after a verdict has been
reached, the court has assumed that the defendant was
harmed and suffered prejudice.192 Accordingly, the existence
of a Rosario violation meets the prejudice requirement of CPL
section 440.10, allowing the statute to control the remedy
while keeping Rosario intact. In short, if a Rosario violation is
proven, then the defendant has suffered prejudice.
The majority, however, read the use of the word "preju-
dice" in CPL section 440.10 to mean that only a case-specific
showing of prejudice would satisfy the statute. This interpreta-
tion is problematic because it ignores the reason why Rosario
demands per se reversals in the first place. It is not just the
violation itself that requires the reversal, but also its effect. A
violation necessarily leaves the defendant ignorant of the
state's witnesses' prior statements. Whether or not the defense
would have been able to successfully impeach the state's wit-
nesses and the effect this impeachment might have had on the
jury are both purely speculative.'93 Moreover, since the de-
fense is unaware of the materials at issue, it is impossible to
know how the materials would have altered defense strate-
gy-including its opening and closing arguments, and cross
examination of other witnesses. 9 4 Hence, as the court has re-
" People v. Jones, 70 N.Y.2d 547, 552 n.4, 517 N.E.2d 865, 868 n.4, 523
N.Y.S.2d 53, 56 n.4 (1987). "If Rosario material is denied the defendant, he has
been deprived of what he should have. It matters not that the denial may have
been inadvertent or immaterial." Id. at 553, 517 N.E.2d at 869, 523 N.Y.S.2d at
57. Thus, the focus of the rule was its effect on the defendant, not the
prosecutor's desire or attempts to comply with it. It would be misleading to say
that the prosecution's motives or behavior is completely irrelevant to Rosario. It
can be argued that the per se rule is, in part, in place to help ensure compliance.
See infra text accompanying notes 260-61. But the rule itself-mandatory disclo-
sure of prior statements-is concerned solely with the defendant having all rele-
vant materials in his possession. If he does not, then his ability to present his
defense is impaired to a degree that cannot be qualitatively measured. Jones, 70
N.Y.2d at 552 n.4, 517 N.E.2d at 868 n.4, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 56 n.4.
'- Id. at 552 n.4, 517 N.E.2d at 868 n.4, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 56 n.4. As the Court
of Appeals previously stated,
[t]he significant fact is that the conclusion that the information was of no
value must necessarily be founded on sheer speculation as to what might
have occurred and matters not in the record: i.e., the questions counsel
might have asked or avoided asking, how the witness might have an-
swered, and how such differences in the testimony might have affected
the decision of the jury.
4 Id. at 551-52, 517 N.E.2d at 868, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 56.
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peatedly held, harmless error analysis is not an appropriate
device for determining the degree of harm a Rosario violation
may have caused a defendant, because it requires the court to
speculate on a myriad of variables, including possible actions
by the defense, before hazarding a guess as to a specific
outcome.' 9
The dissent's approach, focusing on the rationale behind
the per se standard, is more persuasive. The dissent noted that
in cases involving the withholding of evidence, it is possible to
determine the effect of a Brady violation by examining the
probative value of the withheld materials.19 In contrast, the
dissent notes, "[in cases involving other classes of errors ...
the nature and quantum of proof is irrelevant in determining
what constitutes 'prejudice,' and the inquiry requires a more
subtle analysis."197 These "classes of errors" refer to cases in
which the nature of the error requires an automatic rever-
sal. 19
8
A good example of this judicial approach can be found in
People v. O'Rama.'99 The Court of Appeals in O'Rama re-
quired a reversal when a trial court had violated its statutory
duty to notify defense counsel of the precise contents of a
juror's inquiry even though the defendant had failed to show
prejudice because the error was "inherently prejudicial."2 0
O'Rama illustrates that a per se reversal standard may be ap-
..5 Id. at 552 & 552 n.4, 517 N.E.2d at 868 & 868 n.4, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 56 &
56 n.4. In addition, if the government believes a witness may be impeached, they
may choose not to call that witness at all. The variety of different actions and
reactions that may result from full compliance support the Jones court's holding.
" Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d at 653, 585 N.E.2d at 804-05, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 492-93.
(Titone, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 49-51 (discussing Brady and exculpato-
ry materials).
I" 78 N.Y.2d at 653, 585 N.E.2d at 804, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 492 (citation omitted).
1g8 See, e.g., People v. Hilliard, 73 N.Y.2d 584, 540 N.E.2d 702, 542 N.Y.S.2d
507 (1989) (deprivation of basic right to representation not subjected to harmless
error analysis); People v. Lewis, 64 N.Y.2d 1031, 1032, 478 N.E.2d 198, 198, 489
N.Y.S.2d 57, 57 (1985) (errors in trial coures closing instructions that deprive the
defendant of his right to jury consideration of the crime elements are deemed prej-
udicial "'no matter how conclusive the evidence") (quoting People v. Walker, 198
N.Y. 329, 334, 91 N.E. 806, 808 (1910)); People v. Brown, 48 N.Y.2d 388, 395, 399
N.E.2d 51, 54, 423 N.Y.S.2d 461, 464 (1979) (errors affecting jury's deliberative
process prejudicial to the extent they tend to compromise the jury process).
"9 78 N.Y.2d 270, 579 N.E.2d 189, 574 N.Y.S.2d 159 (1991).
2- Id. at 280, 579 N.E.2d at 194, 574 N.Y.S.2d at 164.
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plied not only to rules governing constitutional rights,20 ' but
also to rules where the violation does not readily lend itself to
a post-hoc review.0 2 As the Jackson dissent observes, "[tihe
teaching of O'Rama and [other cited cases] is that certain
kinds of errors occurring during trial are intrinsically prejudi-
cial because they either detract from the process or impair the
defendant's ability to present a defense."203 Furthermore,
"[they] represent a shorthand way of saying that errors with
that class are prejudicial by their very nature and that, accord-
ingly, nothing further need be shown to compel reversal."2 4
Both Rosario and O'Rama offer insight into which errors
must be considered "inherently prejudicial." Significantly, the
O'Rama decision expressly relied on the per se rationale of
post-Rosario cases for support,25 which further indicates the
claim that Rosario violations, if established, would automati-
cally satisfy the prejudice requirement of a collateral motion.
Therefore, the court should have concluded that if Erick Jack-
son established a Rosario violation, he would have satisfied the
statutory requirement. To hold that specific, individualized
prejudice must be demonstrated is contrary to the principle
and specific language of the Rosario doctrine.
The Jackson court ignored this precedent, stating: "we
think it would be imprudent to read the prejudice requirement
out of the statute by taking the per se error rule and applying
it in CPL section 440.10 context."0 6 This statement, however,
reveals the majority's misreading of Rosario: it is the existence
201 See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2" By comparison, the court has found that judicial examinations for other
violations, such as withholding evidence, can be properly evaluated. See supra note
53.
20 Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d at 654, 585 N.E.2d at 805, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 493.
20 Id. at 654, 585 N.E.2d at 805, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 493.
2' The O'Rama court stated that an error committed in the instant case by the
trial court was "inherently prejudicial." People v. O'Rama, 78 N.Y.2d 270, 280, 579
N.E.2d 189, 194, 574 N.Y.S.2d 159, 164 (1991) (citing People v. Jones, 70 N.Y.2d
547, 517 N.E.2d 865, 523 N.Y.S.2d 53 (1987) and People v. Perez 65 N.Y.2d 154,
480 N.E.2d 361, 490 N.Y.S.2d 747 (1985)). Although Judge Titone wrote the opin-
ion in O'Rama, which he favorably cited in Jackson, it was unanimously supported
by the O'Rama court. This leads to the conclusion that the court as a whole
agrees there are errors that cannot be analyzed through a post-hoc harmless error
review. Moreover, it supports the argument that the court considered a Rosario
violation to be such an error since it unanimously approved this interpretation in
O'Rama.
2" Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d at 647, 585 N.E.2d at 801, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 490.
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of prejudice that is assumed per se, not the need for reversal.
Thus, the existence of a violation is an admission of prejudice
which therefore necessitates the reversal. Hence, the reversal
follows a finding of prejudice and does not "impugn" the stat-
ute or alter Rosario. Therefore, the Jackson majority's inter-
pretation of the statutory requirements of CPL section 440.10,
and the interaction between the statute and the Rosario doc-
trine, are critically flawed. The holding which results from this
logical hiccup is altogether unwarranted.
2. The Resultant Internal Inconsistencies
By focusing on the type of appeal brought rather than the
nature of the initial violation, the majority opinion has created
internal inconsistencies in both the application of the Rosario
rule and the implementation of CPL section 440.10.27 As a
result, CPL section 440.10 motions may sometimes be reviewed
under a per se reversal standard, even though, according to
Jackson, these are always supposed to be reviewed under a
harmless error test if used to present a Rosario claim. Simulta-
neously, the Rosario rule, previously accorded per se status,
now may be amenable to a harmless error analysis on occa-
sion. This lack of internal coherence in Jackson leads to absurd
and irrational results. For example, the majority found it ap-
propriate for a lower court to apply a harmless error analysis
to a Rosario violation in a post-appeal case. But, if the majori-
ty believes that Rosario is, in fact, reviewable under harmless
error, it is unclear why the court would continue to disallow it
in preappeal circumstances. The majority cannot mean to
2" Jackson will allow some defendants pursuing CPL § 440.10 claims to retain
the per se status, while other defendants with CPL § 440.10 claims will have to
survive a harmless error analysis. Thus, although the majority maintains that
Jackson both affirms the Rosario doctrine and requires that CPL § 440.10 has a
prejudice requirement that controls the applicable standard of review, there will be
cases where Rosario is given primacy over CPL § 440.10 and other cases where
Rosario is subordinated to CPL § 440.10, even though in both instances a Rosario
claim is being made through a CPL § 440.10 motion to vacate.
208 The majority asserts that the contradictory approach to Rosario results from
the court's desire to retain Rosario without overriding the prejudice requirement of
CPL § 440.10. But, if the majority is correct in believing that the finality interests
protected by the requirement for specific prejudice allow for harmless error to be
applied to Rosario, then surely this societal interest would be operative in pre-ap-
peal settings as well.
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suggest that the process of affirming a conviction could
transform an "inherently prejudicial" error into a non-prejudi-
cial error when the error was not discovered until after the ap-
peal was heard.09
Conversely, if a defendant's CPL section 440.10 motion is
heard before the appeal reaches the appellate court, the per se
rule must be applied.210 Presumably, this is because the court
still believes that it is impossible for the trial court to ade-
quately judge the extent of prejudice suffered by the defen-
dant.21' If the appeal is decided before the CPL section
440.10 hearing, however, then suddenly, inexplicably, the low-
er court is capable of evaluating how the withheld materials
would have affected the defense strategy, the witnesses' re-
sponses and the jury's decision. This distinction is illogical.
Yet, since Jackson was decided, at least one lower court has
followed the new rule and held that a Rosario violation be-
comes reviewable precisely when the appellate court affirms
the defendant's conviction.2
20 This scenario assumes that the appellate court would be unaware of the vio-
lation. The affirmation would be a denial of the defendant's stated grounds for
appeal. Obviously, the defendant would not have raised the Rosario issue because
the violation was not known by the defendant prior to the appeal.
210 Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d at 648, 585 N.E.2d at 801, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 489.
21 As discussed earlier, the court has previously held that harmless error is
inapplicable because it is impossible to determine what effect the material would
have had on defense strategy, the reaction of the witness(es), and the credibility
the jury might have assessed to the witness(es) in light of this new material. In
short, the trial court would have no basis of knowledge for determining what
might have taken place had the violation not taken place because there are simply
too many unknown factors to include in a judicial calculation. See supra notes 40-
42, 80-82 and accompanying text. Of course, one might say the above argument,
coupled with the limited reach of the statutory-based limitations of Jackson, ex-
plains why the court left the per se standard in effect for violations on direct
appeal. A more cynical approach might state that there was not enough support
on the bench to roll back Rosario any further at the time Jackson was decided.
2"2 In an interesting ruling, one court found that the appropriate standard of
review for a pending CPL § 440.10 hearing had shifted when the appellate court's
decision arrived. See People v. Machado, 159 Misc. 2d 94, 603 N.Y.S.2d 273 (Sup.
Ct. Kings County 1993). How the court arrived at this holding is indicative of the
confusion surrounding Jackson:
The rule applicable between the two extremes, and to this case in partic-
ular, is less clear. But Judge Titone, who vigorously dissented in the
Jackson case, has interpreted that case as requiring a showing of preju-
dice where, as here, the conviction has been affirmed by the Appellate
Division prior to a determination of the CPL 440.10 motion. . . . Judge
Titone's interpretation of the Jackson case-albeit a disapproving one-is
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Post-trial stipulations offer another illustration of
Jackson's failings. People v. Young,213 for example, involved a
violation that was disclosed after the trial. The prosecution
and the defense entered into a stipulation that expanded the
record to reflect the error. This cooperative effort allowed the
appellate court to rule on the Rosario claim while deciding the
direct appeal. Without the stipulation, the appellate court
would have heard the appeal while the Rosario issue was
brought before the trial court. In such a case, if the motion is
denied by the trial court, it then may be appealed to the appel-
late court, independent of the direct appeal.214 Jackson deters
efficiency-driven stipulations such as this because the prose-
cution surely would prefer that the trial court, not the appel-
late court hear the motion.215 Using this process, if the appel-
late court affirms the conviction first, the trial court then must
apply a more stringent test to the defendant's claim. In this
scenario, the court's ability to apply harmless error to a
Rosario violation evidently springs into being when the parties
agree to the stipulation.
At the heart of this confusion is the court's refusal to take
an unambiguous position on Rosario and the per se standard.
If, as the Jackson majority claims, a harmless error analysis is
inapplicable to Rosario violations, then it follows that it should
be inapplicable to all Rosario violations. But if, as the Jackson
majority also claims, a harmless error analysis is applicable to
Rosario violations, then it also follows that the harmless error
standard always should be applicable.216 The majority appar-
ently tried to resolve this analytical anomaly by allowing the
procedural mechanism propelling a defendant's claim to de-
adopted as a correct statement of the law.
Id. at 102-03, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 279.
213 79 N.Y.2d 365, 591 N.E.2d 1163, 582 N.Y.S.2d 977 (1992).
214 Id. at 372, 591 N.E.2d at 1167, 582 N.Y.S. at 981; see also N.Y. CRIM.
PROC. L. § 440.10.
211 Prior to Jackson, the per se rule would apply regardless of the forum. The
stipulation provided a measure of economic efficiency without affecting the stan-
dard of review. The prosecution now simply has to decline to enter such a stipu-
lation in order to keep the motion to vacate before the trial court.
216 Such reasoning begs the fundamental question in Jackson. Is Rosario a rule
that can be properly evaluated in a harmless error analysis? If the court believes
that it can, then it ought to overturn its precedent and reformulate the rule. If
Rosario is simply not a violation that can be so analyzed, then Jackson is a deci-
sion reductio ad absurdum.
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termine which standard of review applies. The lack of any
meaningful relationship between the requisite procedure and
the violation, however, renders this approach absurd.
Further complicating the situation, the court seems to
assert that the type of review given a violation is based on
whether the appeal is direct or collateral when, in fact, the
only criterion for determining the standard of review is the
chronological status of the appeal. Thus, some motions to va-
cate receive one standard, others another. The defining char-
acteristic is always whether the direct appeal is pending or
already decided-not the existence of the statutory constraints
of a motion to vacate.
As the above analysis indicates, the majority's reliance on
the procedural means of appeal, rather than on the violation or
the statutory remedy, is untenable, particularly since the pro-
cedural vehicle is not dispositive of the issue. The truly disposi-
tive element is whether the decision of the appellate court has
been handed down, which in this context represents nothing
more than a symbolic demarcation of time passed since the
conviction at trial.217 Hence, it would appear that perhaps it
was not really the language of the statute, nor the nature of
Rosario, that demanded the court's holding. Given the lack of
intellectual currency behind the court's stated rationale, per-
haps the dissent is correct when it argues that the real driving
force behind the holding is the majority members' desire to
avoid upsetting established convictions.21 This would indi-
cate that Jackson is indeed more reflective of personal policy
preferences than judicial reasoning.219
217 In cases such as Jackson, the Rosario violation is not before the appellate
court so the affirmation of the conviction has no relationship to the violation.
Therefore, the appellate decision has no legal correlation to the violation. It is,
however, the last time that the case is assured of coming before the court. Thus,
if the Court of Appeals wanted to institute some form of a time-line for Rosario,
pegged to an event in the procedural process, the appellate process is not only the
most pragmatic place to do so, it also is the last point at which it could be done.
218 See supra text accompanying note 162.
219 The dissent complained that the holding in Jackson was less a product of
legal analysis than a reflection of the subjective policy preferences of the majority.
Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d at 659-60, 585 N.E.2d at 808-09, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 496-97
(Titone, J., dissenting). The majority countered that Rosario was originally a policy
decision and the holding in Jackson was designed to balance a valid, competing
policy interest. Id. at 645, 585 N.E.2d at 799, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 487. To better
understand the dissents charge, it is important to understand the practical result
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Since the court's decision is not justified by legal mandate,
stare decisis or legislative directives, then perhaps the only
way the holding could retain a measure of credibility would be
if it were supported by some genuine interest necessitating
this result. As a matter of logic, the majority's reaffirmation of
Rosario in principle requires a compelling interest to warrant
the creation of a Jackson exception.22 The majority believed
that finality was sufficiently compelling to warrant the aban-
donment of Rosario in the post-appeal setting.
B. The Policy of Finality in the Context of Rosario
Putting aside whether or not Rosario requires a per se
assumption of prejudice, and assuming, that the statutory
language could be read to reflect the legislature's interest in
finality, the pivotal question remains whether finality justifies
the holding. While finality is certainly a legitimate issue in
criminal jurisprudence, an examination of finality in the con-
text of Rosario violations demonstrates that the Jackson excep-
tion does not advance any of the interests inherent in finality
as a policy consideration.
The majority declared the result in Jackson was necessi-
tated by the societal interest in finality as expressed by the
legislature in CPL section 440.10.221 This construction by the
of Jackson. The Jackson exception places a de facto limitation on per se reversals
for Rosario violations with the exact time-table dependent on each case's appellate
review schedule. This means that for approximately two years a defendant may be
able to obtain a per se reversal. The subsequent retrial would take place soon
after. The logistical and practical burdens on the prosecution of retrying the case
generally are not that severe. If, however, there is a substantial time lag between
the original trial and a retrial, 10 years for example, then the level of difficulty in
retrying the case normally would be substantially greater. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 242-43 for a discussion of the difficulties in retrying cases. Therefore,
it appears that the Jackson majority was willing to accept the consequences of a
per se standard for Rosario when the violations were raised within a short time
after the trial, but not when the issue was raised at a later time when it would
be more difficult for the prosecution to reconvict.
"0 If Rosario is still a viable doctrine, then an exception based on the time-
liness of a motion that has no time constraints ought to promote some substantial
or compelling interest to displace it.
21 Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d at 646, 585 N.E.2d at 800, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 488. As
Judge Titone noted in his dissent, however, these arguments are left unarticulated.
"[T]he word 'policy' appears no less than 11 times in the majority's opinion and at
least seven references are made to balancing society's and defendanfs interests, as
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court contains two errors. First, legitimate interests protected
by finality are not material to post-appeal Rosario claims. Sec-
ond, the meaning given to the finality doctrine by the court is
problematic. The Jackson court appeared more concerned with
the difficulties inherent in retrying old cases than with the
more immediate benefits of finality-such as conserving judi-
cial resources and avoiding multiple opportunities for litiga-
tion.22 2
1. Jackson Fails to Protect Finality Interests
Invocations of finality are perhaps justifiable in the con-
text of criminal convictions. 223 Economic efficiency, the alloca-
tion of scarce judicial resources, and the need for closure in
settled convictions are valid societal and judicial interests.
The Jackson exception, however, will not promote these goals,
nor ensure that guilty parties are properly punished in accor-
dance with their sentences. An examination of the consequenc-
es of extending the per se standard to all Rosario viola-
tions-regardless of the timeliness of the complaint-clearly
illustrates that finality is not germane to Rosario. There is no
reason to believe that there would be more than a handful of
cases where post-appeal CPL section 440.10 motions would be
filed for Rosario violations. 5 Thus, there is little likelihood
though the mere repetition of those concepts alone has the power to persuade." Id.
at 650, 585 N.E.2d at 803, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 491.
See id. at 647, 585 N.E.2d at 800, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 488-89.
Presumably, the Legislature, in balancing the competing policy concerns,
including its own right sense of justice, recognized the need for defen-
dants to receive their punishment unless they were able to show that
they were entitled to the statutory remedy and that they had been preju-
diced by the trial error that was at issue in the motion to vacate.
Id. Having established legislative intent on behalf of the legislature, the court
went on to say, "[iun including a prejudice requirement in CPL 440.10(1)(f), the
Legislature was concerned about society's interest in finality of judgments. We too
recognize this interest is formidable." Id. at 647, 585 N.E.2d at 801, 578 N.Y.S.2d
at 489. The use of "presumably" indicates that this is the majority's opinion of
what the legislature intended because it is what the majority would have in-
tended. The majority's statement regarding the legislature's concerns appears to be
a transposition of its own view of finality for that of the legislature.
2" People v. Crimmins, 362 N.Y.2d 230, 326 N.E.2d 787, 367 N.Y.S.2d 213
(1975) (discussing need for finality in context of harmless error analysis in crimi-
nal appeals).
" See, e.g., Custis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1732, 1739 (1994).
' Rosario was decided in 1961. It took 30 years for this issue to come square-
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that there would be an undue drain on the judicial system's re-
sources. 6 Furthermore, since Rosario violations are consid-
ered so inherently prejudicial as to merit automatic reversal
when raised on direct appeal, the importance of finality is, in
and of itself, an insufficient reason to risk the integrity of final
judgments and the need for just punishment.
It is the nature of a Rosario violation itself, not the level of
judicial review imposed, that makes an increase in the number
of post-appeal motions to vacate highly improbable. There is
absolutely no reason to think that explicitly maintaining the
per se standard would somehow trigger post-appeal discoveries
of past violations. There is simply no relationship between the
ability to discover violations and the existence of an available
remedy.227 Put more directly, a defendant's finding that the
prosecution withheld discovery material is dependant on fac-
tors completely outside the appellate process. Means of dis-
covery notwithstanding, many courts, prior to Jackson, had al-
ready assumed that Rosario carried a per se standard. 8 De-
spite the existence of such a defendant-friendly judicial per-
spective, there has been a profound absence of collateral, post-
direct appeal Rosario claims. The infrequency of such claims is
likely to continue regardless of the standard used.
A Rosario violation comes into existence when the prosecu-
tion fails to deliver its witnesses' prior statements to defense
counsel prior to trial.229 If testimony at trial does not reveal
the violation and the prosecution does not opt to acknowledge
the error, no mechanism exists to notify the defendant that
such a prior statement had been made. Without knowledge of
ly before the Court of Appeals. In fact, Jackson and its companion case, People v.
Bin Wahad, 79 N.Y.2d 787, 587 N.E.2d 274, 579 N.Y.S.2d 636 (1991), were the
first and only cases where the collateral attack took place well after the conviction
was affirmed.
"8 Jackson was the first case in 30 years to raise a Rosario violation years
after the appeal. Finality is not at issue since the context of Jackson and like
cases make the possibility of other similar circumstances remote. This removes the
question of judicial efficiency from the discussion.
' Claims of Rosario violations must be grounded in the knowledge that some-
thing specific was withheld. Either the defendant is aware of Rosario material or
he is not.
' People v. Jackson, 142 Misc. 2d 853, 538 N.Y.S.2d 677 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1988).
'z People v. Perez, 65 N.Y.2d 154, 159, 480 N.E.2d 361, 364, 490 N.Y.S.2d 747,
750 (1985).
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the withheld statement, the defendant cannot file a CPL sec-
tion 440.10 motion.2 0 Furthermore, since the appellate pro-
cess concerns matters in the record, it is highly unlikely that
the defendant's appellate counsel would be able to indepen-
dently, discover the existence of the violation through prepar-
ing the appeal.
Discounting a new investigation by appellate counsel,
there are two means by which the violation might be uncov-
ered. The first is if the prosecution recognizes the error on its
own and notifies the defendant. 231' The second is when the
error is revealed through a civil action related to the criminal
event. As in Jackson, a civil suit might lead to uncovering a
Rosario violation.232 However, the defendant will not auto-
matically enjoy the benefits of this discovery. Since, there is no
necessary relationship between the civil suit and the defen-
dant, the attorney in the civil action will not be looking neces-
sarily for such errors in the discovery process. Moreover, the
attorney in the civil action is not obligated to inform the defen-
dant of the violation if he or she is not representing the defen-
dant2 s
" To be completely accurate, the defendant can always file a CPL § 440.10
motion, but courts may deny it without a hearing if the defendant cannot produce
a withheld statement. This is why, for all practical purposes, a defendant cannot
pursue a CPL § 440.10 motion on Rosario grounds unless he has knowledge of a
specific violation.
"' The standard of review shift in Jackson leads to an interesting hypothetical
question. If a prosecutorial discovery of a violation in the pre-appeal stage would
trigger an automatic reversal, but a post-appeal discovery would lead to a harm-
less error analysis, it is more likely that any such prosecutorial discoveries will be
made after the appeal has been heard. Since the due diligence required of prose-
cutors under Rosario is to be carried out prior to and during the trial, not after
the judgment, the prosecution is not required to confirm its compliance with the
rule once the jury's verdict is in. It might appear then, in the context of Jackson,
that any such verification of compliance by the prosecution, undertaken on their
own initiative, would probably be delayed until after the appeal is ruled on, if it
is done at all.
See also People v. Bin Wahad, 79 N.Y.2d 787, 587 N.E.2d 274, 579 N.Y.S.2d
636 (1991) (companion case to Jackson in which defendant discovered Rosario
material via civil action after direct appeal was exhausted).
Robert Sullivan, Jackson's attorney for the CPL § 440.10 hearing and sub-
sequent appeals, chose to inform Jackson of the Rosario material. He could just as
easily have chosen not to. Erick Jackson was very lucky that Robert Sullivan
opted to take Jackson's case when Jackson had no idea that there was an issue to
act on. If he had not, Erick Jackson would still be serving his original sentence,
unaware of the errors that led to his new trial.
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Because defendants have such a low probability of discov-
ering the violation after the trial, a different holding in Jack-
son would not have led to a greater number of valid CPL sec-
tion 440.10/Rosario-based motions to vacate. For most defen-
dants, the burden of proving an actual violation at a CPL sec-
tion 440.10 hearing obviates the collateral Rosario attack as a
viable avenue for reversal. Consequently, an inundation of
Jackson-like cases is highly improbable and does not pose a
risk to the goal of finality.
Another aspect of finality, protecting the integrity of the
trial and appellate process, also is not relevant to Jackson. It
can, of course, be argued that once a defendant is properly
convicted and sentenced, the prescribed punishment must be
meted out or the entire trial process will be undermined. Fun-
damental to this fairness argument, however, is a requirement
that the conviction be arrived at in a just manner.14 It is pa-
tently clear that when the defendant's conviction is achieved
through an "inherently prejudicial" error at trial, the principle
of upholding the conviction must be subordinated to the inter-
ests of fairness."
If, as the Jackson court noted, the Rosario rule is predicat-
ed on "a right sense of justice,"236 then presumably, violation
of this rule could lead to an injustice. Indeed, because of the
possibility of injustice, if a Rosario violation is raised in the
pre-appeal stage of a case, the Jackson majority would grant a
per se reversal. Therefore, one can conclude that an injustice
done at trial eclipses the need for finality, just as the unjust-
ness of the conviction legitimizes any subsequent re-litigation.
Accordingly, the goals of finality in fact-finding and adjudica-
tion of criminal charges are not at risk when the purported
violation emanates from Rosario material.
2. The Actual Finality Interest Behind Jackson
As this Comment previously observed, the Jackson court's
distinction between direct and collateral appeals rests on a
'4 See, e.g., Custis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1732 (1994).
'5 People v. O'Raroa, 78 N.Y.2d 270, 280, 579 N.E.2d 189, 194, 574 N.Y.S.2d
159, 164 (1991).
... People v. Rosario, 9 N.Y.2d 286, 289, 173 N.E.2d 881, 883, 213 N.Y.S.2d
448, 449 (1961).
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false dichotomy.27 The court's reliance on the distinction be-
tween pre- and post-conviction discovery of a violation is with-
out merit and serves no useful purpose.238 Moreover, the le-
gitimate concerns that lie at the heart of finality are not at
issue in Rosario cases, and its introduction into Jackson is
inappropriate. It is curious that in its application of finality to
collateral Rosario motions, the court did not discuss in detail
those aspects of finality with which it was most concerned.
Perhaps this is because the court had given finality another
meaning, albeit one with a more arbitrary bend.
Apparently when the court refers to finality, it is address-
ing neither the integrity of a jury trial nor the need to uphold
verdicts for the sake of judicial efficiency. Rather, the court is
actually concerned with instances where there is a substantial
period of time between the original conviction and the CPL
section 440.10 hearing. The court is clearly alarmed that retry-
ing a case years after the first trial would present the state in-
surmountable obstacles. 9 As the dissent noted, something
about applying a per se standard of reversal to previously af-
firmed criminal convictions is apparently unacceptable to the
Jackson majority." ° It is seemingly this specter of convicted
felons launching collateral attacks on their convictions at a
time when it is no longer practical for the state to renew prose-
cution that vitiates or lessens the injury of the Rosario viola-
tion and justifies placing an additional burden of proof on a
defendant.
The majority's prioritizing the timeliness aspect of Jackson
See supra text accompanying notes 211-22.
Opponents of the per se standard might argue that the distinction actually
serves a very valuable purpose. Namely, Rosario violations that are de minimis
and could not, in any conceivable way, have led to a different verdict at trial
cannot automatically result in a vacatur of the conviction. This position, however,
would require courts to repudiate the Rosario doctrine as espoused in the post-
Rosario cases. Since the Jackson majority announced its continued support for this
doctrine, which was reaffirmed in a post-Jackson case, the argument has no force
in relation to Jackson. Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d 638, 585 N.E.2d 795, 578 N.Y.S.2d 483
(1991); People v. Banch, 80 N.Y.2d 610, 616-17, 608 N.E.2d 1069, 1072-73, 593
N.Y.S.2d 491, 494-95 (1992) (citing People v. Martinez, 71 N.Y.2d 937, 524 N.E.2d
134, 528 N.Y.S.2d 813 (1988) and People v. Consolazio, 40 N.Y.2d 446, 354 N.E.2d
801, 387 N.Y.S.2d 62 (1976)).
' Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d at 647, 585 N.E.2d at 801, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 489.
240 See supra note 160 for an explication of the dissenfs criticism of the Jack-
son majority's approach to jurisprudence.
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is misplaced considering that CPL section 440.10 motions are
permissible at any time after a conviction is entered." 1 Had
the legislature been concerned with upsetting older, settled
convictions it most certainly could have included a provision in
the statute to distinguish between pre- and post-appeal situa-
tions. Alternatively the legislature could have created a time
limitation to bar older motions. In addition, since the delay in
time prior to the filing of a CPL section 440.10 for a Rosario
violation results from prosecutorial error, it is unfair that the
consequence of those errors should be a burden for the defen-
dant.
Certainly the more time that elapses after a trial, the
more difficult it becomes to retry the case. Witnesses and evi-
dence are harder, if not impossible, to find years after the fact.
Yet just as it is harder for the prosecution to put on a second
trial long after the first was completed, it is also harder for the
defense to properly contest the charges. 2 More importantly,
the court does not clearly state why this burden should be
borne by the defendant and not by the prosecution. 3 Since
the error originated with the prosecutor's actions it seems only
just that if either party is to be penalized it ought to be the
prosecution, not the defendant.
Unlike other types of claims under CPL section 440.10,
Rosario claims result not from novel grounds for appeals artic-
ulated years after the trial, but from prosecutorial actions,
beyond the control of the defendant.2" The court's use of fi-
nality here places the burden of proof upon the defense simply
241 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. L. § 440.10.,
2412 If the state can still mount an effective prosecution, the defendant may be
hard pressed to find witnesses. This is made more complicated because the
defendant's friends who testified for him may now be dead or in jail, and impar-
tial bystanders are harder to find where the defendant has not had any contact
with them since the trial. Compounding this problem is the fact that the defen-
dant usually has more limited resources than the state in terms of tracking down
missing people and gathering evidence. In addition, the state may be able to have
prior testimony of now-unavailable witnesses read into the record at retrials.
243 The court could not have meant to say that had the defendant been aware
of the violation at an earlier time a "right sense of justice" would require a new
trial, but since he had spent many years in jail, perhaps unnecessarily, this sense
of justice no longer operated.
'4 The cause of the violation may be intentional or inadvertent, but in either
case, the prosecutor is the actor whose conduct causes the violation. The defendant
has no means to influence compliance.
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because it was unaware of a fact in the exclusive possession of
the prosecution. This result is unfair, since it punishes the de-
fendant for prosecutorial error or misconduct. Although the
majority opinion mentions this consequence, it does so without
noting its relevance to questions of timeliness.245
The Rosario-based motion to vacate is a scenario unlike
others raised in CPL section 440.10 motions.246 Thus, any ar-
gument that a per se standard for Rosario violations made via
CPL section 440.10 motions would offer defendants the oppor-
tunity to exploit procedural rules without substantive grounds
for the appeal, is specious at best. 7 Consequently, the final-
ity argument, offered without explanation is just not support-
able. The rule promulgated in Jackson will not protect any in-
terest properly served by finality.
One might wonder what the fuss is all about, considering
how infrequently cases like Jackson arise. The answer is that
retaining the per se standard for collateral motions would not
negatively affect the justice system; removing it would. This is
best understood by shifting the spotlight from the exemption's
impact on the defendant to its potential influence on prosecuto-
rial behavior.
24 The court, referring to the prosecution's dominion over the prior statements,
stated that "simple fairness" underlied Rosario. Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d at 644, 585
N.E.2d at 799, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 487. Of course, it can be argued that all violations
subject to a harmless error test involve burden-shifting. Rosario violations can be
distinguished, however, because the finding of harm is ordinarily considered to be
too speculative for a reviewing court.
141 In many cases, the new evidence may well be something that defense coun-
sel could have, and thus should have, discovered prior to the trial and so it can-
not be considered "new" evidence. This is exactly what the court decided when
notified that Julio Cruz could not have overheard Jackson admitting to the arson.
The court did not challenge Jackson's assertion that he and Cruz were housed in
separate facilities-a fact that, absent proof of some remarkable auditory prowess
on Cruz's part, was clearly exculpatory. The court did, however, find that this
particular point was something that defense counsel could have discovered before
Jackson's original trial. The fact that they failed to investigate Cruz or his
statement was tantamount to waiving or failing to preserve an issue for appeal.
People v. Jackson, 65 N.Y.2d 265, 269-70 n.3, 480 N.E.2d 727, 730 n.3, 491
N.Y.S.2d 138, 141 n.3.
247 Obviously, filing a CPL § 440.10 motion does not guarantee a hearing.
Futhermore, even if a defendant can make a sufficient showing that Rosario mate-
rial may have been withheld, she still has to prove its existence at the hearing
and avoid having the statement classified as an exception to the rule. See, e.g.,
People v. Consolazio, 40 N.Y.2d 446, 354 N.E.2d 801, 387 N.Y.S.2d 62 (1976)
(duplicative equivalents do not constitute Rosario material).
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C. The Long-Term Impact of Jackson: Rewarding Non-
Compliance
The Jackson court correctly noted that very few cases
involving post-appeal Rosario violations ever come before the
court.248 Yet the low volume of such cases does not mean that
Jackson will be a case of minimal impact. The end result of
Jackson will be that far more cases involving Rosario viola-
tions will not be heard until the appellate process has conclud-
ed.249 This is because under Jackson, prosecutors who admit
to Rosario violations during trial face an automatic reversal
when the record reflects the transgression. But prosecutors
who can postpone a CPL section 440.10 hearing until after the
appeal will reap the benefits of the defendant's new burden of
proof. Clearly the prosecution has an incentive to delay post-
conviction hearings for as long as possible to gain the more
generous standard.
The Jackson holding provides prosecutors with an added
inducement not only to delay CPL section 440.10 hearings, but
to withhold prior statements altogether. This is the very type
of behavior that the Rosario doctrine was designed to prevent.
Jackson's promise of a more friendly standard of review for
prosecutors who withhold statements or fail to comply diligent-
ly with discovery portends inevitable disaster for at least some
future defendants. But, as is the case with undiscovered
Rosario violations, only the prosecution will know for sure.
Of course, Rosario violations occur for reasons other than
the intentional withholding of known documents. For example,
the prosecution might have no knowledge of police reports or
related documentation as to a prospective witness and no im-
mediate way to recognize that an error had been commit-
ted.5 Less convincingly perhaps, the prosecutor may possess
24' "In the 31 years since Rosario was decided, this case is the first before this
Court to raise a Rosario violation in the context of a CPL 440.10 brought motion
after direct appeal was completed." Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d at 648, 585 N.E.2d at 801,
578 N.Y.S.2d at 489.
249 If the court meant to assert that there would continue to be very few simi-
lar cases reaching the Court of Appeals after Jackson it probably would be correct.
But that would only be because Jackson was dispositive of the issue, not because
CPL § 440.10 hearings for Rosario violations on a post-appeal basis will continue
to be as rare as before Jackson. Indeed, the prosecution can only benefit by delay-
ing such hearings until the appeal has been heard.
"' The validity of the lack of knowledge argument is case-specific. In certain
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the statements but believe they are not Rosario material. 1
It would be reductive to say that the purpose of the per se
standard was simply to prevent a prosecutor who was willing
to withhold evidence from doing so. As the court has stated,
the focus of the Rosario rule is to provide the defendant with
the prior statements before trial. If the prosecution fails to do
this, the defendant is not being accorded what is needed to
mount a fair defense.5 2
The court also was concerned, however, with the possibili-
ty of prosecutorial misconduct. In People v. Vilardi, 3 the
court touched on the purpose of the Rosario doctrine stating
that "in a related area, we have found our State concerns for
fairness and prosecutorial misconduct to be of such paramount
importance that we have imposed a rule of automatic reversal
for nondisclosure." 254 Thus, the court found
a backward-looking, outcome-oriented standard of review that gives
dispositive weight to the strength of the People's case clearly pro-
vides diminished incentive for the prosecutor, in first responding to
discovery requests, thoroughly to review files for exculpatory materi-
al or to err on the side of disclosure where exculpatory value is de-
batable.25
The facts in Jackson illustrate the lengths that some pros-
ecutors are willing to go to not only defend the Rosario error,
but to perhaps knowingly commit the initial violation. The
assistant district attorneys who prosecuted Jackson failed to
turn over prior statements by a star witness who indicated
that he did not believe that the fire had been a result of ar-
son. 6 These statements had been made directly to a prose-
cases prosecutors very well may be unaware that a police officer who is testifying
for the state has made certain reports which were not turned over to the prosecu-
tors. For example, the police had a policy at one time of writing reports that they
would later use to brief commanding officers for high profile cases. These reports
usually were not turned over to the district attorney's office and could have consti-
tuted Rosario violations. McKinley Jr., supra note 7, at B3. But, the more bound-
less argument that the prosecutors cannot reasonably be expected to know what
material is in existence as a general rule already has been discounted by the
Court of Appeals. See infra note 264 and accompanying text.
251 See supra text accompanying note 56.
252 See, e.g., People v. Jones, 70 N.Y.2d 547, 517 N.E.2d 865, 523 N.Y.S.2d 53
(1987).
76 N.Y.2d 67, 555 N.E.2d 915, 556 N.Y.S.2d 518 (1990).
21 Id. at 76, 555 N.E.2d at 919, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 522.
25 Id. at 77, 555 N.E.2d at 915, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 523.
25 People v. Jackson, 154 Misc. 2d 718, 722-23, 593 N.Y.S.2d 410, 412-13 (Sup.
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cutor who later testified at the CPL section 440.10 hearing
that he had destroyed his notes of those interviews with the
investigators." 7 Moreover, he also testified to doing so as a
normal matter of course."' Additional internal memoranda
dealt directly with the fire marshal's testimony.25 9 In none of
these instances could ignorance of the materials' existence be
claimed. In addition, the Rosario rule is not an arcane, little-
used legalism. The prosecutors were not new to their jobs and
must have been well-versed in their official discovery responsi-
bilities. Hence, it is unlikely that these omissions or failure to
disclose were completely accidental.
Despite the extent and exculpatory nature of the Rosario
violations, Erick Jackson discovered this exculpatory evidence
by sheer luck.26 Had Robert Sullivan's clients settled with
Waldbauin's and the city at an earlier date, Sullivan might
never have come across these documents and Jackson would
still be serving his life sentence.26' One can only speculate as
to how many other violations have been committed in other
cases because a prosecutor withheld Rosario material, inadver-
tently or intentionally, without the error being discovered. As a
matter of inductive reasoning, if the prosecution was willing to
go to such lengths to convict Erick Jackson, it is inevitable
that other, similar violations have also occurred. Furthermore
such flagrant violations took place despite the potential for a
per se reversal. It appears self-evident that weakening the per
se standard would only result in a dilution of the compliance
component of Rosario and encourage greater disregard for
prosecutorial discovery obligations.
The per se standard also prevents inadvertent violations
more effectively than does the harmless error standard. For
obvious reasons, prosecutors have decried these per se stan-
dard as too severe and administratively taxing. Between the
Ct. Kings County 1992); see also supra text accompanying notes 101-04, 169.
257 154 Misc. 2d at 731, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 419.
" Id. Interestingly enough, such a comment could point to countless Rosario
violations committed over the prosecutor's career.
211 Id. at 724, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 414.
" A secondary argument to be made in favor of the pre-Jackson, Rosario doc-
trine is the limited discovery rules in criminal cases. In essence, Erick Jackson
was saved by the more liberal civil discovery rules.
21 Hoffman, supra note 7, at A29.
1994]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
police reports, witness statements, and assorted law enforce-
ment reports and miscellaneous summaries, criminal trials
unquestionably can generate tremendous amounts of paper-
work. But, if compiling Rosario material is indeed a burden,
that burden must rest with the prosecution, since it is the only
party with the ability to provide the defendant with the appro-
priate documentation. The Court of Appeals made its view on
this point clear in Ranghelle, stating "society's interest in
maintaining criminal trials as truth-finding processes requires
that the burden of locating and producing prior statements of
complaining witnesses, filed with police agencies, remain solely
with the People."262
Ultimately, Rosario violations occur only when the prose-
cution fails to hand over prior statements and information
related to its prospective witnesses.263 Given that reversals
stem from their own actions, prosecutorial complaints over the
per se standard are unconvincing. These complaints are fur-
ther undermined by how easily prosecutors can comply with
Rosario. As the court recently noted in People v. Banch, "the
difficulty is not with the Rosario doctrine but with the People's
seeming lack of care in discharging their discovery obliga-
tion. ,2
The Court's statement indicates that the prosecution does
not always take due care to sufficiently gather Rosario docu-
mentation or release the materials to defense counsel.
265
These occasional failures sometimes may be self-remedying
through late compliance which discloses the material at trial
26 People v. Ranghelle, 69 N.Y.2d 56, 64, 503 N.E.2d 1011, 1016, 511 N.Y.S.2d
580, 585 (1986). At least one member of the Court of Appeals believes that the
per se standard places too great a burden on the state. According to Judge
Bellacosa, the per se standard "'plants an uncertainty into every tried criminal
case. It is a law enforcer's nightmare .... '" People v. Banch, 80 N.Y.2d 610,
625, 608 N.E.2d 1069, 1078, 593 N.Y.S.2d 491, 500 (1992) (Bellacosa, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting his dissent in People v. Jones, 70 N.Y.2d 547, 557, 517 N.E.2d 865,
872, 523 N.Y.S.2d 53, 59-60 (1987)) (citations omitted).
26 People v. Rosario, 9 N.Y.2d 286, 173 N.E.2d 881, 213 N.Y.S.2d 448 (1961).
2. Banch, 80 N.Y.2d at 621, 608 N.E.2d at 1076, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 498.
26 In addition, prosecutors may occasionally look to circumvent Rosario alto-
gether. In Consolazio, the prosecutor admitted that he kept the witnesses' signa-
tures from being affixed to their questionnaires to avoid the Rosario requirement.
People v. Consolazio, 40 N.Y.2d 446, 454, 354 N.E.2d 801, 805, 387 N.Y.S.2d 62,
66 (1976).
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without necessarily triggering a reversal.266 The possibility
that the material may be exempt from Rosario because it is
duplicative also provides a disincentive for due diligence.267
The end result is that even with the per se standard, and pre-
suming the good faith of prosecutors, prosecutorial compliance
with Rosario is far from automatic.
The Jackson holding creates a new window of escape for
prosecutors who have not complied with Rosario. Had the court
simply applied the assumption of prejudice to Rosario viola-
tions as it had done previously,26 the People's obligations un-
der Rosario would not have changed. But, basing the standard
of review of a case on its chronological position will have im-
mediate consequences on prosecutorial strategy. No longer rel-
egated to arguing that the statements are outside the scope of
Rosario or qualified as duplicative equivalents, the prosecution
now may simply wait out the appeal. If successful, their viola-
tion, previously substantial enough to merit automatic rever-
sal, suddenly becomes harmless error unless the defendant can
show otherwise.6 9
Thus, the long-term effect of the Jackson holding does not
actually address finality or issues of efficiency. Rather, it pro-
motes outcome-derivative thinking. Prosecutors, already will-
ing to risk per se reversal for failure to meet their "ethical and
professional obligations,"27 ° are now presented with the op-
portunity to transform prosecutorial error into a meaningless
"technical error."27' Trial judges no longer will look simply for
the existence of the error, but instead will weigh the evidence
to determine whether the error could have possibly changed
28 See supra notes 65-66 for a comparison of delay and failure.
27 The possibility of avoiding full disclosure may periodically lead to a balanc-
ing test for some prosecutors. On one side is the possible damage the defense can
wreak if the material is provided, and on other is the potential for the violation to
be discovered. This is certainly not meant to imply that prosecutors as a whole
seek to avoid discharging their obligations, but where there are legitimate loop-
holes in the Rosario requirement, it should not be surprising that the pressure to
win at trial, coupled with the competitive nature of the adversarial system, may
lead to the occasional "error" in compliance.
28 See People v. Jones, 70 N.Y.2d 547, 517 N.E.2d 865, 523 N.Y.S.2d 53 (1987).
28 People v. Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d 638, 585 N.E.2d 795, 578 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1991).
270 People v. Vilardi, 76 N.Y.2d 67, 555 N.E.2d 915, 556 N.Y.S.2d 518 (1990)
(citations omitted).
21 People v. Banch, 80 N.Y.2d 610, 626, 608 N.E.2d 1069, 1079, 593 N.Y.S.2d
491, 501 (1992) (referring to Rosario violations as "technical errors").
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the outcome of the trial. The lack of a bright line rule, coupled
with the inherently speculative nature of assessing prejudice in
Rosario violations, will lead to more haphazard, post-hoc arbi-
trary remedies. The unfortunate consequence is that while
Jackson does not necessarily spell the end of Rosario, it cer-
tainly is a significant step backwards in protecting the right of
defendants to have fair and proper access to the materials
necessary to help insure a fair trial.2
D. Jackson and the Lower Courts: The Effect of
Decentralization
At first glance, the Jackson exception appears to present
an unambiguous rule that lower courts can easily follow. The
Jackson court's holding specifically states that when a defen-
dant makes a CPL section 440.10 motion for a Rosario viola-
tion and his direct appeal has been exhausted, the motion
must be reviewed under a harmless error analysis.' Al-
though Jackson seemingly posits a bright line rule for when
2"2 The dissent in Jackson criticized the majority opinion as marking, for all
intents and purposes, the end of Rosario. The dissent reasoned that if Jackson
would require CPL § 440.10 motions based on Rosario violations to satisfy harm-
less error tests, the only types of violations that would pass judicial muster were
those where the withheld material was clearly contradictory. Therefore, according
to the dissent, the material also would be exculpatory and would actually be
Brady material. The dissent also read the majority opinion as holding that all
such CPL § 440.10 motions were to receive the harmless error test, not just those
decided in post-appeal cases. Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d at 658-59, 585 N.E.2d at 808,
578 N.Y.S.2d at 496 (Titone, J., dissenting). Although there is some merit to this
view, it is somewhat inaccurate. While it most probably will prove to be true that
many prior statements will fall under the Brady umbrella, some of the post-Jack-
son cases indicate that some courts will set a fairly low prejudice requirement.
See, e.g., People v. Banch, 80 N.Y.2d 610, 617, 608 N.E.2d 1069, 1073; 593
N.Y.S.2d 491, 495 (1992). Consequently, there will be, or at least can be, cases
where the material is not sufficiently exculpatory to meet Brady standards but can
still clear the Jackson hurdle. In addition, the Jackson dissent's fear that the
phrasing of the majority in Jackson would be taken to mean that the appellate
review time-line was only dicta has been proven unfounded, at least for now, by a
subsequent case. See id. at 615, 608 N.E.2d 1072, 593 N.Y.S.2d 494 (Rosario viola-
tions subject to harmless error analysis in post-appeal setting only).
273 As the court stated: "Thus, we hold that a defendant who has exhausted
direct appeal and who seeks to raise a Rosario claim by way of a CPL 440.10
motion will be required to make an actual showing that prejudice resulted from
the prosecution's failure to turn over Rosario material." Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d at 641,
585 N.E.2d at 797, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 485.
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either standard of review must be applied, its failure to define
what constitutes sufficient prejudice to warrant a reversal has
surrendered judicial consistency to decentralized, subjective
discretion. 4 This leaves the lower courts in the position of
applying harmless error tests without any guidelines from the
Court of Appeals. Negating one standard without giving more
than a passing nod to its replacement inevitably leads to sub-
jective holdings, unpredictability, and dissimilar treatment for
similarly situated defendants.
This lack of guidance has created two distinct, but related
problems. The first concerns the burden of proof the defendant
must satisfy to have his motion granted. While Jackson, and
subsequently, Banch, described the standard as one of "reason-
able possibility" that the failure to disclose the material "con-
tributed to the verdict,"275 both cases fail to articulate a clear
and useful definition of this standard. The second problem is
one encountered by both the trial and appellate courts at-
tempting to measure the level of prejudice suffered. Although
these two issues appear virtually identical at first, they actu-
ally address different aspects of the harmless error test.7
1. The Court of Appeals' Definition of Prejudice
The point of confusion stems from the court's oft-stated
opinion that harmless error cannot be applied to Rosario be-
cause of the nature of the violation. The Jackson majority now
says that while this is still true,7 ' the lower courts must ap-
", The lack of uniformity is a direct result of the mixed messages inherent in
Jackson. On one hand, Jackson indirectly affirmed the Rosario doctrine, which
says that harmless error cannot be applied to Rosario violations. Yet, on the other
hand, Jackson proceeded to require the courts to apply the test anyway. Id. at
648, 585 N.E.2d at 801, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 489.
25 Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d at 649, 585 N.E.2d at 802, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 490.
27 The first issue, defining both "possibility" and "contributed to the verdict," is
in fact distinct from the one involving the quantum of evidence, although there is
of course some overlap between the two. Defining 'possibility of contributing to the
verdict" requires an examination of the value of the evidence in terms of how
much weight the jury might have given it. This becomes increasingly difficult
when the previously non-disclosed material relates to a more tangential witness.
The second question concerning the degree of harm actually suffered by the de-
fendant entails an examination of the potential use-value of the undisclosed mate-
rial rather than what value the jury had assigned to this particular bit of testimo-
ny. Both analyses involve the same material, but to slightly different ends.
" The majority does not explicitly say that this is so. But, in the absence of
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ply it anyway.27 Thus, a determination as to what use might
have been made of previously undisclosed material or the im-
pact it may have had on the jury, is remanded to the specula-
tion of the trial court. Assuming for the moment that reason-
able people can disagree over such hypothetical suppositions,
the inevitable result of Jackson is that the outcome of a
defendant's motion turns upon not just the facts at hand, but
who hears the motion as well. Thus, not only will there be an
unavoidable decline in consistency and predictability in deter-
mining future Rosario violations, but, given the volatility of
the debate on Rosario and the widely contrasting judicial opin-
ions on its rational legitimacy,279 the disparity between differ-
ent courts' rulings may be quite severe.
In a recent decision, the Court of Appeals indicated that it
viewed Jackson as a narrow exception to Rosario rather than a
more substantial reassessment. In People v. Banch, the court
held that pre-trial hearings were subject to the same Rosario
standards as trials .2 " Addressing Rosario, the court stated,
"[ulnderscoring the seriousness of the Rosario obligation, we
have recognized only three exceptions to the rule of per se
reversal."28' Two of these exceptions involve materials that
could not, or need not, be disclosed. 282 The third exception,
Jackson, provided for "cases arising on collateral review pursu-
ant to CPL 440.10, after exhaustion of a defendant's direct ap-
peal."283 The court went on to say that a new trial was re-
quired if "the defendant can demonstrate 'a reasonable pos-
sibility that the failure to disclose the Rosario material contrib-
uted to the verdict.'28
The court's standard of a "reasonable possibility" previous-
any alternative language, one must assume that the stated principle of the
Rosario doctrine is still operative.
278 See Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d 638, 585 N.E.2d 795, 578 N.Y.S.2d 483.
279 See supra note 9.
2- 80 N.Y.S. 610, 608 N.E.2d 1069, 593 N.Y.S.2d 491 (1992).
281 Id. at 616, 608 N.E.2d at 1072, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 494.
28 The first exception concerns material that is the "duplicative equivalent" of
other produced material. The second concerns lost or destroyed material. In the
latter instance, the trial court looks to both the degree of prejudice to the defen-
dant and prosecutorial fault in order to impose an appropriate sanction or preclu-
sion. Id. at 616-17, 608 N.E.2d at 1072-73, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 494-95.
283 Id.
284 Id.
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ly had been a relatively easy standard for the defendant to
meet. In Jackson, the court elaborated only briefly on the type
of standard to be applied. A year earlier, however, Judge Ju-
dith Kaye, writing for the court in People v. Vilardi,285 dis-
cussed more fully the use of the "reasonable possibility" stan-
dard when a defendant had to prove prejudice resulting from a
prosecutor's withholding material which was specifically re-
quired to be provided to the defense. The court stated that it
found "the prosection's failure to turn over specifically re-
quested evidence to be 'seldom, if ever, excusable' and to verge
on prosecutorial misconduct.""' Because of the severity of the
violation, the defendant has the burden of proof but is only ob-
ligated to meet the threshold of "possibility" rather than the
more arduous "probability" standard. Judge Kaye's inclusion of
the "possibility" standard in the discussion of the Jackson
exception in Banch infers that the Rosario violation is "seldom,
if ever, excusable.""' The Jackson' majority also used Vilardi
as its point of reference for the "possibility" standard, further
indicating that the lower threshold was intended and that
supporting the argument that Judge Kaye's language in
Vilardi applied equally to Rosario violations."'
In contrast, Judge Bellacosa dissented in Banch, arguing
that the reasoning in Jackson was persuasive and should have
been applied more widely.8 9 Bellacosa's dissent derives from
his desire to roll back Rosario to its original state and to the
court's disagreement over Rosario generally.29 This ongoing
- 76 N.Y.2d 67, 555 N.E.2d 915, 556 N.Y.S.2d 518 (1990).
21 Id. at 74, 555 N.E.2d at 918, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 521.
267 Id. at 75, 555 N.E.2d at 916, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 522.
28 The majority held that a defendant seeking relief through a CPL § 440.10
motion under Jackson "must demonstrate a reasonable possibility that the failure
to disclose the Rosario material contributed to the verdict." One reason for employ-
ing this standard, the court stated, was that "it is the standard that is currently
in use for Brady material." Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d at 649, 585 N.E.2d at 802, 578
N.Y.S.2d at 490 (citation omitted).
2 Banch, 80 N.Y.2d at 621-27, 608 N.E.2d at 1076-79, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 498-
501. (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
Judge Bellacosa was not joined in his concurring opinions in Jones, 70
N.Y.2d 547, 553, 517 N.E.2d 865, 869, 523 N.Y.S.2d 53, 57 (1987) and Novoa, 70
N.Y.2d 490, 499, 517 N.E.2d 219, 225, 522 N.Y.S.2d 504, 510 (1987). It may have
been that his opinion was not widely shared. It also may have been that he advo-
cated doing away with the per se standard completely, replacing it perhaps with a
open-file discovery process. Banch, 80 N.Y.2d at 626-27, 608 N.E.2d at 1079, 593
N.Y.S.2d at 501 (Bellacosa, J., concurring). Such an extreme position may have
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dispute intimates why, despite Banch's rather clear language
regarding the relatively low levels of prejudice needed to satis-
fy Jackson, some lower courts have applied a more prosecutor-
friendly approach in post-Jackson cases. 1
Two related factors may explain this deviation. One is that
the court in Jackson sent mixed signals concerning its underly-
ing intent. There are certainly statements in the holding that
can be construed as applying the Jackson exception to post-
conviction cases, not just post-appeal cases.292 It is not sur-
prising that lower court judges who were displeased with the
Rosario rule before Jackson may have seized on this aspect of
the holding to authorize a deviation from the Banch court's
interpretation of Jackson. In addition, prosecutors have con-
tended in several cases that whenever a CPL section 440.10
motion is reviewed, it should be scrutinized under the harm-
less error test since the per se rule only applies to appellate
review of direct appeals. 293 This leads to the second factor:
judges may take the position that "commonsense limitations"
to'Rosario lead to a broader use of judicial discretion when
applying the harmless error test in specific cases. 4
2. Disparity and Confusion in the Lower Courts
A review of some of the lower courts' post-Jackson deci-
sions demonstrate that the contradictory language in Jackson
has created confusion over the proper standard of analysis. In
People v. Bianco,295 for instance, the trial court introduced its
dissuaded other members of the bench from signing on to his opinions, even if
they had agreed that the Ranghelle decision might have taken Rosario too far.
"' See infra notes 302-06.
The majority stated that, "on postconviction motion, where as we hold today,
CPL 440.10 requires a finding that the defendant was prejudiced by the failure to
turn over Rosario material." Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d at 649, 585 N.E.2d at 802, 578
N.Y.S.2d at 490. Taken literally, the above statement obviously would support the
argument that Jackson does indeed stand for the elimination of the per se stan-
dard for all CPL § 440.10 motions.
2. People v. Robles, 194 A.D.2d 750, 600 N.Y.S.2d 77 (2d Dep't 1993); People v.
Townsend, 156 Misc. 2d 494, 593 N.Y.S.2d 956 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1993);
People v. Nikollaj, 155 Misc. 2d 642, 589 N.Y.S.2d 1013 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County
1992).
294 Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d at 644, 585 N.E.2d at 799, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 487.
29 153 Misc. 2d 509, 582 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sup. Ct. Cayuga County), rev'd, 183
A.D.2d 284, 591 N.Y.S.2d 287 (4th Dep't 1992).
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opinion as one of first impression regarding the Jackson
rule.296 The court initially established a relatively low thresh-
old for the "reasonable possibility" test and then determined
that this standard had been met.297 On appeal the court's or-
der granting the motion was reversed."' Unlike the trial
court, the appellate court believed that the prejudice require-
ment included a reasonable possibility that the jury would
have acquitted the defendant had the Rosario material been
properly disclosed, rather than a reasonable possibility that
the verdict was unduly influenced.9 9 The appellate court also
ruled that because no contradictory statements were involved
in the case at hand, there was no impeachable material, and
therefore no prejudice.00 Thus, the trial and appellate courts
disagreed over the interpretation of the harmless error stan-
dard itself, and over the definition of impeachable materi-
al.301
People v. Robles302 also involved a lack of consensus be-
tween the trial and appellate courts. This time the trial judge
held that Jackson required the court to treat all CPL section
' While it is not completely clear that it was a case of first impression, the
court relied on only Jackson and pre-Jackson cases for support. Id.
29 The court treated "possibility" as meaning "a difference in degree between
that which common sense views as likely at all and that which is seen as more
likely than not." Id. at 515, 582 N.Y.S.2d at 626. In addition, "'[clontributing' to a
verdict" was defined as "an element of materiality or importance. Not necessarily
rising to sine qua non status.. . ." Id.
"s People v. Bianco, 183 A.D.2d 284, 591 N.Y.S.2d 287 (4th Dep't 1992).
Id. at 288, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 291.
Id. Thus, in one of the first cases to be decided in the post-per se period, an
appellate court immediately dispensed with the Court of Appeals's long-standing
interpretation of impeachable materials. See People v. Rosario, 9 N.Y.2d 286, 173
N.E.2d 881, 213 N.Y.S.2d 448 (1961) (stating non-contradictory statements may
still have impeachment value).
"'1 The intermediate appellate court did not state that it disagreed with the
lower court's reading of "contributing to" or "possibility," although it used different
language. The appellate court's only stated disagreement is with the degree of
prejudice suffered by the defendant. The fundamental problem with the appellate
court's treatment of Bianco, however, is the court's search for contradictory state-
ments as the linchpin of prejudice. The essential argument in Rosario itself is that
prior statements can have all sorts of value, even if they do not offer direct con-
tradiction. What use may be made of this material can best be answered by de-
fense counsel, and the results of this usage would be pure conjecture. See supra
note 39. Hence, any finding based solely on the presence of directly conflicting
statements runs counter to the basic tenets of the entire Rosario doctrine.
"0 153 Misc. 2d 859, 583 N.Y.S.2d 138 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1992), remanded
by 194 A.D.2d 750, 600 N.Y.S.2d 77 (2d Dep't 1993).
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440.10 motions as requiring harmless error analyses, regard-
less of the status of the defendant's appeal."3 Although the
court found a Rosario violation, it did not find sufficient preju-
dice to warrant a vacatur.0 4 The appellate court, however,
ruled that the trial court had erred by applying the harmless
error test, since Banch had determined that as long as the
defendant's appeal was pending, the per se standard still ap-
plied.30
5
Robles seems to have settled the question concerning
which standard of review applies to pre-appeal CPL section
440.10 motions. As indicated by the cases above, however, the
investigation into prejudice may still yield conflicting results.
For example, the trial judge may find prejudice only to have
the appellate court determine that there was none. These con-
tradictory rulings underscore the Court of Appeals' observation
that determining the prejudicial impact of a Rosario violation
is just too speculative to allow for a harmless error analy-
sis.306
Assuming that reasonable people may disagree with the
results of the harmless error tests as applied to Rosario viola-
tions, inevitably judges will be partially influenced by their
personal acceptance of one of the principles of Rosario."7 A
per se proponent might point to the "speculation" argument
3 Id. at 861, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 139.
Id. at 862, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 140.
o Robles, 194 A.D.2d 750, 600 N.Y.S.2d 77 (2d Dep't 1993). In an ironic twist,
the trial judge in Robles was a former assistant district attorney who had been
part of the prosecution team in Jackson. See supra note 171. All things consid-
ered, his failure to see any prejudice to the defendant is not astonishing. Nor is
his interpretation of Jackson particularly surprising, although the latter was not
necessarily shared by other members of the bench. In a similar case decided after
the CPL § 440.10 motion was denied in Robles, but before its reversal, another
court considered the same argument. Although it acknowledged the Robles deci-
sion, the court disagreed with the Robles court's conclusion. "Logic dictates . . .
that a per se standard apply since to require a showing of prejudice at this stage
would force the trial court to deny the motion on the very grounds upon which
the appellate court must reverse as per se error." People v. Nikollaj, 155 Misc. 2d
642, 648, 589 N.Y.S.2d 1013, 1017-18 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1992); see also Peo-
ple v. Townsend, 156 Misc. 2d 494, 593 N.Y.S.2d 956 (Sup. Ct. Kings County
1993) (applying per se error for CPL § 440.10 motion hearing because defendant
had not yet perfected direct appeal).
" See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
307 9 N.Y.2d 286, 173 N.E.2d 881, 213 N.Y.S.2d 448, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 866
(1961).
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articulated in People v. Jones,"' as well the compliance com-
ponent, to justify granting a lower standard for the defendant.
Alternatively, a judge may believe that where there had been
convincing evidence at trial, and when the Rosario material is
not clearly exculpatory, granting the CPL section 440.10 mo-
tion would be tantamount to freeing a guilty party on a techni-
cal violation. If the issue is determined at the judge's discre-
tion, it is unlikely that he or she would choose to do so.0 9
Ultimately, the question is whether a particular judge
would be willing to reverse a conviction for someone who may
very well be guilty when there is some evidence that, absent
the violation, the defendant "possibly" could have been acquit-
ted. This is more of a policy decision than a strict question of
jurisprudence and legal reasoning. These decisions, no matter
how objective the judges may believe them to be, are by defini-
tion subjective. As Judge Titone notes in his dissent in Jack-
son, "[tihe term prejudice... is fraught with ambiguity."31
Such abstruseness makes disparate judgments unavoidable,
even amongst the most well-intentioned people. 1'
Thus, by allowing the continued use of the harmless error
analysis, the Court of Appeals has sanctioned dissimilar re-
sults for similar cases. The happenstance selection of a judge
or judges may be the determining factor in cases where previ-
ously random results automatically had been precluded. This
3- 70 N.Y.2d 547, 517 N.E.2d 865, 523 N.Y.S.2d 53 (1987).
" In this scenario the Jackson dissents fears regarding the de facto end of
Rosario are closest to being realized. Some courts may simply refuse to grant
reversals unless convinced that the defendant has a reasonable possibility of being
innocent, as opposed to being "not guilty." This is a problem inherent in having
already been convicted. The defendant may have his motion denied because the
court believes that the defendant committed the crime and so does not deserve to
benefit from an incidental error by the prosecution. Of course, it is important to
remember that Erick Jackson was assumed to be guilty after his conviction and,
despite the overwhelming evidence to the contrary, there are undoubtedly those
who still believe that he was in fact guilty.
',o Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d at 653, 585 N.E.2d at 804, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 492.
", This is not to say that a judge is likely to deny a motion in contravention
of the obvious facts. Where there is both strong evidence of guilt and a Rosario
violation that may have affected the verdict, however, a judge may be inclined to
deny the motion, even if the defendant's claim meets the standard alluded to in
Jackson and Banch, because she believes that there is still too much evidence of
guilt to warrant a new trial. This possibility explains, in part, why the Court of
Appeals may have removed judicial discretion from the equation in People v.
Rosario, 9 N.Y.2d 286, 173 N.E.2d 881, 213 N.Y.S.2d 448 (1961).
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disparity in the application of the law demands that the Court
of Appeals abandon Jackson and confront Rosario directly.312
IV. CONCLUSION
People v. Jackson should have been a simple case for the
Court of Appeals. The Rosario cases had explicitly and repeat-
edly held that failure to provide prior statements of govern-
ment witnesses automatically prompted reversal. The Jackson
decision is notable in that it marks the first time in over thirty
years that the court refused to apply that principle. If Jackson
stood for nothing else, it indicated a new willingness by the
court to put aside the reasoning behind Rosario when the re-
sults troubled the court. Defense advocates may be worried by
the implications in Jackson and what it augers for Rosario's
future.
But Jackson also represents another policy issue-one that
another court, perhaps at another time in history, may have
relied on for a diametric holding. In Jackson, six firefighters
died tragically. The fire department's claim of arson led to
extensive headlines and political pressure on law enforcement
agencies to produce a conviction. Once the prosecution moved
against Erick Jackson they were unable to turn back. As excul-
patory evidence developed, it was buried. The intentional and
deplorable misconduct of certain prosecutors involved in the
case illustrates precisely why compliance is an issue in crimi-
nal trials. Moreover, it demonstrates the manifestly unjust
consequences that abuse of power can wreak.
While Jackson was an exceptional case, it stands for the
idea that in the highly politicized and adversarial world of
crime and criminal prosecution, there must be some deterrent
to prosecutorial negligence or impropriety. For, as Jackson so
clearly establishes, when the prosecution is determined to con-
vict a person who is without the financial resources to pursue
a thorough, private investigation, there is no check on their au-
thority, and no institution to prevent abuse. Perhaps the ma-
.12 Given that the author of the majority opinion in Jackson has been removed
from the New York Court of Appeals, and one of the dissenters has resigned, it
remains to be seen what direction the court would take if it were to revisit this
issue in the future.
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jority was correct in seeing Jackson as a contest between com-
peting policies. A "right sense of justice," however, demands a
different outcome.
Michael Lumer

